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V 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The District Court and this Court have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 78A-5-102 (formerly codified as 78-3-4). This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Section 78A-4-103 (formerly 
codified as 78-2a-3j). This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by the District 
Court on November 5, 2007. {See Order, R. at 6020-6025.) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction as a 
matter of law. 
Standard of review: correctness. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 
2007 UT App 407 If 34,175 P.3d 572 (holding that the appellate court review the trial 
court's ruling on summary judgment and the trial court's interpretation of a contract 
for correctness). 
Preservation for appeal: Bank One raised the issue in the trial court (R. at 34-
36; R. at 3031-34), and Bodell noted opposition (R. at 49-63; R. at 4038-4533). 
2. Whether the Settlement Agreement discharges the claims against Bank 
One and Robbins. 
Standard of review: correctness. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 
2007 UT App 407 If 34,175 P.3d at 579 (holding that the appellate court review the 
trial court's ruling on summary judgment and the trial court's interpretation of a 
contract for correctness). 
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Preservation for appeal: Bank One raised the issue in the trial court (R. at 34-
36; R. at 3031-34), and Bodell noted opposition (R. at 49-63; R. at 4038-4533). 
3. Whether the trial court correctly excluded, in part, the expert testimony 
of Merrill Weight. 
Standard of review: abuse of discretion. Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237 
% 12, 74 P.3d 621, 635 (holding that a trial court's decisions regarding the 
admissibility of expert testimony are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard). 
Preservation for appeal: Robbins raised the issue in the trial court (R. at 2865-
2873), and Bodell noted opposition (R. at 3390-3403). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following authorities may be determinative of issues raised by this appeal: 
Utah Code Section 15-1-1; Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and Rule 37 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: NATURE, 
PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITION 
1. Bodell Construction Company ("Bodell") filed this action on July 31, 
2003, against Mark H. Robbins ("Robbins"); Cherokee & Walker Investment 
Company, L.L.C. ("CWIC"); Cherokee and Walker, L.L.C. ("Cherokee"); Bank One, 
Utah ("Bank One"); and DOES 1 through 50. (Compl., R. at 1-20.) 
2. Bodell's Complaint included the following claims: (1) common law 
fraud against Robbins and the Doe defendants; (2) civil conspiracy against Robbins 
and the Doe defendants; (3) negligent misrepresentation against Bank One; (4) unjust 
2 
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enrichment against Robbins, CWIC, Cherokee, and the Doe defendants. (See Compl., 
R. at 1-20.) 
3. On October 29, 2003, Bank One filed a motion for summary judgment, 
moving the trial court to dismiss the claims against Bank One with prejudice based on 
the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. (Mot. S.J., R. at 34-36. See also 
Mem. Supp. Mot. S.J., R. at 37-48.) 
4. CWIC, Cherokee, and Robbins joined in the motion for summary 
judgment. (R. at 90-92, 309-10.) 
5. On March 15,2004, the trial court issued an order denying the motion 
for summary judgment. (R. at 316-320.) 
6. On June 6, 2006, the Court dismissed Bodell's claims against CWIC 
and Cherokee, pursuant to a joint motion for voluntary dismissal. (R. at 1596-1598, 
1874-1943.) 
7. On September 19,2006, Bodell filed its First Amended Complaint, 
maintaining its original claims against the defendants and asserting an additional 
claim of common law fraud against Bank One. (R. at 2219-2242.) 
8. On June 29, 2007, Robbins moved to exclude the expert testimony of 
Bodell's damages expert, Merrill Weight ("Weight"). (Mot., R. at 2865-2873; Mem. 
Supp., R. at 2874-3030.) 
9. Bank One joined in the motion to exclude the expert testimony of 
Merrill Weight. (R. at 3365-3372.) 
842261.1 
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10. On August 22, 2007, the trial court issued an order granting the motion 
to exclude the expert testimony of Merrill Weight. (R. at 4766-69.) 
11. On July 2,2007, Bank One filed another motion for summary judgment, 
moving the trial court to dismiss the claims against Bank One based, in part, on the 
affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. (Mot. S. J., R. at 3031-34. See also 
Mem. Supp. Mot. S.J., R. at 3035-3222.) 
12. Robbins again joined in the motion for summary judgment. (R. at 3223-
3361.) 
13. On September 10, 2007, the trial court requested supplemental briefing 
from the parties regarding whether it could reconsider the order of March 15, 2004 
denying the motion for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of accord and 
satisfaction. (Hrg., R. at 6256, pp. 61:17-63:12.) 
14. On October 3,2007, in an oral ruling, the trial court reversed its earlier 
order and granted summary judgment on the affirmative defense of accord and 
satisfaction. (Hrg. pp. 27:13-28:17, R. at 6255.) 
15. On November 5, 2007, the trial court entered a written order granting 
summary judgment in favor of defendants. (R. at 6020-25.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On or about August 30, 2000, MSF Properties, L.C. ("MSF"), executed 
a promissory note in the amount of Four Million Dollars in favor of Bodell (the 
"Promissory Note"). (R. at 2238-39.) 
842261.1 
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2. Marc S. Jenson ("Jenson") personally guaranteed MSF's obligations 
under the Promissory Note and executed a guaranty, on or about August 30,2000, in 
favor of Bodell (the "Guaranty"). (R. at 2240-42.) 
3. The Promissory Note and Guaranty provided consideration for a loan 
from Bodell to MSF in the amount of Four Million Dollars (the "Loan"). (R. at 
2240.) 
4. Jenson asserted that he made a number of partial payments on the 
Promissory Note totaling just under Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars. (Jenson Dep. 
at 334:7-338:8, R. at 3333-34.) 
5. In addition, Jenson claims to have made in-kind payments to Bodell, 
including a Rolex watch, a pistol, and an in-store credit at a high-end clothing 
boutique. (Jenson Dep. at 340:2-345:19, R. at 5244-5249.) 
6. However, Bodell maintains that Jenson only made one payment, on 
May 2,2001, in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars. (PI. Mem. Opp. 
at xix T| 38, R. at 0456; Weight Dep. at 103:14-104:6, R. at 4481-82; Expert Report at 
5, R. at 4512. See also Jenson Dep. at 337:9-22, R. at 3334.) 
7. On or about March 18, 2003, Bodell entered into an agreement with 
MSF and Jenson in order to "achieve a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and 
other matters outstanding between them, including, but not limited to the Loans" (the 
"Settlement Agreement"). (R. at 3336.) 
8. The Settlement Agreement included the following recitations: 
842261.1 
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WHEREAS, in June and August of 2000, BCC made certain loans to MSF 
(the "Loans"); and 
WHEREAS, Jenson personally guaranteed the obligations of MSF under 
the Loans; and 
WHEREAS, MSF has made partial payments against the amounts 
outstanding under the Loans, but is currently in default under the Loans; 
and 
WHEREAS, the parties now desire to achieve a full settlement of all 
obligations disputes and other maters outstanding between them, including, 
but not limited to the Loans; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth above and 
the covenants and obligations set forth below, and for other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby 
acknowledged, the parties hereby agree [to the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement]. 
(R. at 3336.) 
9. The Settlement Agreement included the following provision: 
Contemporaneous with the execution and delivery of this Agreement, 
MSF has caused $3,000,000 in immediately available funds to be 
delivered to [Bodell]. [Bodell] hereby acknowledges receipt of such 
funds. 
(Settlement Agreement f 1, R. at 3336.) 
10. The Settlement Agreement also included the following provisions: 
Each of [Michael Bodell and Bodell], for himself, itself, their affiliates 
and for all persons or entities claiming by, through or under him, it or 
them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges MSF, 
its affiliates and their respective members, managers, officers, 
employees and agents (each, including without limitation Jenson, an 
"MSF Party") from any and all claims, allegations of fraud, charges, 
demands, losses, damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of 
action, or suits at law and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, 
expenses, costs and attorneys fees, whether known or unknown, 
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each a "Claim"), 
arising out of all past affiliations and transactions among [Michael 
842261.1 
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Bodell], [Bodell] and any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the 
Loans and all related arrangements and transaction, (b) without limiting 
the generality of the foregoing, acknowledges and agrees that the 
obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including 
all principal and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued 
thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full; provided 
that such releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set 
forth in this Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution 
and delivery thereof. 
Each of Jenson and MSF, for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all 
persons or entities claiming by, through or under him, it or them, hereby 
(a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges [Bodell], its 
affiliates and their respective officers, directors, employees and agents 
(each, including without limitation [Michael Bodell], a "Bodell Party"), 
from any and all Claims arising out of all past affiliations and 
transactions among [Michael Bodell], [Bodell] and any MSF Party, 
including, but not limited to, the Loans and all related arrangements and 
transactions; provided that such releases shall not apply to any 
obligation of [Bodell] or [Michael Bodell] set forth in this Agreement to 
be performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof. 
(Settlement Agreement ^ 2-3, R. at 3336.) 
11. The Settlement Agreement included the following provision: 
Each of the parties hereto agrees that, except as necessary to enforce the 
provisions hereof, it shall keep confidential the execution, terms and 
existence of this Agreement. 
(Settlement Agreement f 4, R. at 3336.) 
12. In addition, the Settlement Agreement included the following provision: 
This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding and agreement 
between the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and 
supersedes all prior negotiations, representations, understandings, 
agreements or arrangements between them, whether written or oral, with 
respect to the subject matter hereof. 
(Settlement Agreement 1f 8, R. at 3337.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly ruled that the Settlement Agreement was an accord 
and satisfaction that fully resolved all disputes related to the Loan, Promissory Note, 
and Guaranty. The Settlement Agreement contained all the necessary elements of an 
accord and satisfaction. Whether the Settlement Agreement is viewed as discharging 
liquidated or unliquidated claims, there was sufficient consideration to establish an 
accord and satisfaction. Further, by its express terms, the Settlement Agreement fully 
satisfied the entire dispute as required in an accord and satisfaction. 
As an accord and satisfaction, the Settlement Agreement necessarily 
discharged all persons who may have had liability arising from the dispute, including 
Robbins. Because the Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction that 
discharged the entire dispute, it is not contrary to the Utah Liability Reform Act 
which governs releases of parties. In addition, the fact that the debt owed to Bodell 
was fully satisfied, as evidenced by the express terms of the Settlement Agreement, 
eliminates the factual basis for any further claims for damages against Robbins. 
Finally, the trial court correctly limited the testimony of Bodell's damage 
expert to only include the damage theory that Bodell timely disclosed. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Bodell did not show good cause for 
failing to disclose the expert testimony in compliance with the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that 
allowing Bodell to put on testimony of the untimely damage theories would not be 
harmless, but would prejudice the defendants. For these reasons, as discussed more 
8 
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fully below, Robbins respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court rulings 
that are the subject of this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DISCHARGES 
BODELL'S CLAIMS AGAINST ROBBINS 
An accord and satisfaction releases all claims arising from the obligations of 
the original agreement. Brimley v. Gasser, 754 P.2d 97, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
"An accord and satisfaction arises when the parties to a contract agree that a different 
performance, to be made in substitution of the performance originally agreed upon, 
will discharge the obligation created under the original agreement. The substituted 
agreement calling for the different performance discharges the obligation created 
under the original agreement." Id. (internal citation omitted). 
A. The Settlement Agreement Is an Accord and 
Satisfaction 
The Settlement Agreement satisfies all of the requirements of an accord and 
satisfaction. The elements of contract formation must be present in an accord and 
satisfaction, "including offer and acceptance, competent parties, and consideration." 
Brimley v. Gasser, 754 P.2d at 98 (Utah App. 1988) (internal citation omitted).1 In 
the context of an accord and satisfaction, consideration must be made in one of two 
forms. Consideration may take the form of substituted performance in lieu of the 
performance upon which the parties originally agreed. Id. Estate Landscape and 
1 In this appeal, Bodell has not raised any dispute as to offer, acceptance, or 
competency. 
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Snow Removal Specialists Inc. v. Mountain States Tel & Telco., 844 P.2d 322, 326 
(Utah 1992) (holding that an accord and satisfaction can be based on separate 
consideration where there is no bona fide dispute or unliquidated claim) {citing 
Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980)). Alternatively, the 
consideration may take the form of a resolution of a bona fide dispute over an 
unliquidated claim. Larry J. Coet Chevrolet v. Labrum, 2008 UT App 69 ^ 25 n. 6, 
180 P.3d 765 (citing S & GInc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 738-
39 (Utah 1996)). An additional element is payment made in full settlement of the 
entire dispute. Id. Finally, an accord and satisfaction requires acceptance of the 
payment. Id. If these elements are met, then an agreement is given the effect of an 
accord and satisfaction. 
1. The Settlement Agreement was supported by sufficient 
consideration to establish an accord and satisfaction because it 
resolved a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated claim. 
In this case, the Settlement Agreement resolved a dispute over an unliquidated 
claim. While Bodell has taken the position that its claims against Jenson were easily 
calculable because they were based exclusively on the Promissory Note and Guaranty, 
the record evidence compels a different conclusion. 
• First, the Settlement Agreement expressly states that it resolves both 
liquidated and unliquidated claims.2 (R. at 3336.) It would be 
2 Bodell advances the illogical position that a combination of liquidated and 
unliquidated claims cannot satisfy the requirements of an accord and satisfaction. 
(Appellant's Brief at 15.) However, where any part of a claim or dispute is 
unliquidated, the dispute cannot be liquidated. Such is the situation here. 
10 
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inappropriate to simply read this language out of the agreement 
bargained for by the parties. 
• Second, Jenson disputed whether Bodell had correctly applied all partial 
payments and payments in kind against the amount owing on the Note. 
See Oliphant v. Estate ofBrunetti, 2002 UT App 375 H 18, 64 P.3d 587, 
592 (holding that a dispute over an unliquidated amount existed where, 
even though creditor obtained a default judgment against debtor, the 
judgment did not accurately reflect payments made against the amount 
due). Jenson claimed that, prior to the Settlement Agreement, he made 
payments of nearly Eight Hundred Thousand Dollars to Bodell. (Jenson 
Dep. at 334:7-338:8, R. at 3333-34.) In addition, Jenson made several 
in-kind payments to Bodell, including a Rolex watch, a pistol, and an 
in-store credit at a high-end clothing boutique. (R. at 5244-5249.) 
Bodell's records showed partial payments of a lesser amount. (See id.) 
Moreover, Bodell maintains in this action that Jenson had not paid the 
amount that he claimed. (PL Mem. Opp. S.J. at xix % 38, R. at 0456; 
Weight Dep. at 103:14-104:6, R. at 4481-82; Expert Report at 5, R. at 
4512.) 
• Third, Bodell's potential claims against Jenson, as identified in the 
Settlement Agreement, specifically included, among other things, fraud. 
(R. at 3336.) Certainly, a fraud claim cannot be liquidated where it is 
subject to multiple bona fide defenses such as denial of fault, the fault of 
11 
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the claimant and others, and punitive damages. The allegations 
contained in the First Amended Complaint in this case, contain more 
than a sufficient basis to state a fraud claim against Jenson. Robbins' 
allocation of fault filed in this case underscores that point. (R. at 2853-
2856.) 
2. The Settlement Agreement had sufficient consideration separate 
and independent of the resolution of the unliquidated claims to 
establish an accord and satisfaction. 
In Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that, where "the underlying claim is liquidated and certain as to 
amount, separate consideration must be found to support the accord; otherwise, the 
obligor binds himself to do nothing he was not already obligated to do, and the 
obligee's promise to accept a substitute performance is unenforceable." Id. at 1372. 
Here, the Settlement Agreement expressly provides that it is supported by adequate 
consideration. (R. at 3336.) Moreover, the Settlement Agreement shows 
consideration separate from the unliquidated claims that, standing alone, is sufficient 
to establish an accord and satisfaction. {See R. at 3336-37.) 
Under Utah law, the adequacy of consideration is not measured merely in 
terms of money value equivalents. Gorgoza, Inc. v. Utah State Road Comm 'n, 553 
P.2d 413,415-16 (Utah 1976). Rather, "[i]f one party asks for and receives 
something which he would not otherwise be entitled to from the other, that is 
adequate consideration. Id. (holding that one party's decision to forgo its right to a 
hearing and comply with the other party's request was adequate consideration). 
12 
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The Settlement Agreement includes consideration from MSF and Jenson in the 
numerous forms, each sufficient to satisfy the requirement of consideration. The 
Settlement Agreement states that it is made "in consideration of the premises set forth 
above and the covenants and obligations set forth [therein], and for other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby 
acknowledged." (R. at 3336.) The Settlement Agreement contains covenants and 
obligations in addition to the payment of money. For example, the parties agreed to a 
confidentiality provision that required each party keep the terms and existence of the 
agreement confidential. (R. at 3336.) The parties agreed to a mutual release. (R. at 
3337.) The parties agreed to cooperate in facilitating the purposes of the Agreement. 
(R. at 3337.) The parties made numerous representations and warranties. (See R. at 
3336-37.) The parties agreed to the substitution for prior agreement, and 
acknowledge a full satisfaction of the claims. (R. at 3337.) Because these forms of 
consideration are present, there is adequate consideration to support an accord, even 
if, arguendo, the underlying claim could be liquidated. 
3. The Settlement Agreement fully satisfied the entire dispute as 
required to establish an accord and satisfaction. 
The Settlement Agreement also meets the next element of an accord and 
satisfaction through payment made in full settlement of an entire dispute. The express 
terms of the Settlement Agreement provided, among other things, that MSF deliver 
Three Million Dollars in immediately available funds to Bodell, and that the parties 
discharge their claims arising out of the loan transaction. (R. at 336-37.) In the 
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Settlement Agreement, Bodell specifically "acknowledges and agrees that the 
obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal 
and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed 
fully satisfied and repaid in full." (R. at 3336, emphasis added.) Further, the 
Settlement Agreement "sets forth the entire understanding and agreement between the 
parties with respect to the subject matter hereof, and supersedes all proper 
negotiations, representations, understandings, agreements or arrangements between 
them, whether written or oral, with respect to the subject matter hereof." (R. at 3337.) 
Moreover, Bodell admittedly accepted payment in full satisfaction of the entire 
dispute. (R. at 3336.) Because each of the requirements is present here, the 
Settlement Agreement should be given the effect of an accord and satisfaction. 
B. Because the Settlement Agreement Is an Accord and 
Satisfaction, It Discharges All Claims Arising from the 
Promissory Note and Guaranty. 
The effect of an accord and satisfaction is to fully resolve all claims arising 
from the subject matter of the dispute. An accord and satisfaction has rights and can 
be distinguished from a release, as follows: "an accord and satisfaction is a 
contractual method of discharging a debt or claim by some performance other than 
that which was originally due; a release is a contract whereby a party abandons a 
claim or relinquishes a right that could be asserted against another." Doyle's Const & 
Remodeling, Inc. v. Wendy's Intern., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 969, 976 (N. D. 111. 2001). 
See also Thompson v. Nicholson, Docket No. 30A01-9307-CH-00261, 1994 WL 
44428 *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) ("While a release has been said to be of the nature of 
14 
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an accord and satisfaction, and the two are both methods of settling or putting an end 
to a claim or obligation, they differ from one another in that a release is a 
relinquishment by the creditor or holder of a right, and an accord and satisfaction is a 
discharge of a claim or demand by or for the debtor or person liable, by some means 
other than its full performance.. ..They differ also in that an executed accord, or 
accord in satisfaction, involves the acceptance of something as satisfaction, while a 
release is an acknowledgement of satisfaction.") 
Where the parties reach an accord and satisfaction in addition to executing a 
release, the parties can rely on the accord and satisfaction alone as a bar to claims 
arising from the underlying dispute. Koules v. Euro-American Arbitrage, Inc., 689 
N.E.2d 411, 417 (111. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that "the accord and satisfaction alone 
or the release alone would have operated to bar plaintiffs suit against defendant with 
respect to his guaranteed salary claim"). 
The scope of the Settlement Agreement extends to all disputes between Bodell 
and MSF and Jenson, known and unknown, specifically including the Promissory 
Note and Guaranty. (R. at 3336.) It establishes without any uncertainty that those 
instruments are "deemed fully satisfied and repaid in full." (R. at 3336.) Satisfaction 
of the amounts due under the Promissory Note and Guaranty is all that Bodell seeks 
by this action. Bodell's claimed damages are no more than "the funds advanced, 
together with interest at the legal rate, less payment received from MSF." {See R. at 
2895.) Because the Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction, it fully 
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resolves all claims arising from the Promissory Note and Guaranty as to Jenson and 
all others, including Robbins. 
C. The Discharge Provided by the Accord and 
Satisfaction Is Not Limited to the Parties to the 
Settlement Agreement. 
The discharge is not limited to parties to the Settlement Agreement. As 
discussed above, where the requirements of an accord and satisfaction are met, the 
agreement fully resolves a dispute) the effects of the accord and satisfaction are not 
limited to specific persons. {See § I. B., above.) 
Bodell argues that Robbins cannot benefit from the Settlement Agreement 
because he is not a party to it. Bodell misreads the cases upon which it relies in 
support of its argument. Those cases do not support the position that an accord and 
satisfaction cannot benefit non-parties. Indeed, some of the cases cited by Bodell 
support Robbins5 position that an accord and satisfaction resolves a dispute as to all 
persons. 
For example, Bodell cites Killian v. Oberhansly, 743 P.2d 1200 (Utah 1987) 
for the proposition that, absent a clear intent from the parties to the agreement, a non-
party cannot benefit from an accord and satisfaction. In fact, what Killian stands for 
is nothing more than that a certain Mr. Killian could not invoke the protection of an 
3 In Killian v. Oberhansly, two partners incurred a net loss of over One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars in their dairy business. Partner A offered to pay the outstanding 
grain bill if Partner B would pay the outstanding hay bill. Partner B refused the 
offer. When Partner A sued Partner B to recover the net loss, Partner B asserted 
accord and satisfaction as a defense The court found that there was no evidence 
that the proposed offer, which was not accepted, was an accord and satisfaction as 
to the debts of the partnership. Killian v. Oberhansly, 743 P.2d at 1200-02. 
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accord and satisfaction because there was no accord and satisfaction in the first place. 
As the Utah Supreme Court noted at the outset of its opinion, "[t]he issues raised are 
factual." Id. Thus, the court's holding that there was "clearly substantial evidence to 
support the trial court's finding that there was no accord and satisfaction," is entirely 
unhelpful to the issue at hand. 
Likewise, Bodell's reliance on Fleet Mortg. Corp. v. Shuster, 811 P.2d 81, 82-
83 (N.M. 1991), is unfounded.4 It does not support the contention that an accord and 
satisfaction cannot benefit a non-party. Rather, Fleet stands for the unremarkable 
proposition that "one who is not a party to a contract cannot maintain a suit upon it." 
Id. at 49 (emphasis added). In other words, "[a]ccord and satisfaction is an 
affirmative defense." Messick v. PHD Trucking Serv., Inc., 615 P.2d 1276, 1277 
(Utah 1980). 
The case of Messick v. PHD Trucking Serv., Inc., 615 P.2d 1276, 1277-78 
(Utah 1980), cited by Bodell, is also inapposite. It does not even address whether an 
4 In Fleet, two homeowners defaulted on their mortgage agreement. The 
homeowners divorced, and a court awarded the home to Homeowner A. 
Homeowner A entered an accord and satisfaction with the mortgagor which 
required Homeowner B to execute a quit claim deed. Homeowner B did execute 
the quit claim deed. However, Homeowner B asserted contract and tort claims 
against the mortgagor based on the accord and satisfaction. The court held that 
Homeowner B could not maintain an action based on the accord and satisfaction 
because she was not a party to it, even if she was an incidental beneficiary. Fleet 
Mortg. Corp. v. Shuster, 811 P.2d 81. 
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accord extends to non-parties.5 Nor does Dillman v. Foster, 656 P.2d 974 (Utah 
1983), advance BodelPs argument.6 
Luxemburg v. Can-Tex Indus., 257 N.W. 2d 804 (Minn. 1977), cited by Bodell, 
actually supports the position taken by Robbins. In Luxemburg, the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota applied well-established Minnesota law in holding that a discharge of one 
tortfeasor will discharge all others if the settlement agreement manifests such intent or 
if the plaintiff receives full satisfaction in law or in fact. Id. The Court reaffirmed a 
prior holding that: 
5 In Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., the debtor purchased a vehicle from 
creditors, who financed debtor's purchase. While he owned the vehicle, the debtor 
leased the truck to a trucking company owned by the creditors. Eventually, debtor 
sold the vehicle back to creditors pursuant to a written agreement providing that 
debtor "releases all equity and interest" to creditors. When debtor brought an 
action against the trucking company to recover lease payments, the trucking 
company asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. Holding that there was 
no evidence that the debtor and creditor reached an agreement as to the amount 
owing under the lease agreement, the court ruled that there was not an accord and 
satisfaction as to that claim. Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc. 615 P.2d 
1276. 
6 In Dillman v. Foster, the plaintiffs claimed that they mistakenly conveyed real 
property to the defendant. In support of their claim, plaintiffs provided evidence 
that the defendant executed a settlement agreement with a title company, 
presumably to resolve the title company's potential liability. The settlement 
agreement transferred certain lots to the defendant, and further provided that the 
settlement agreement would in no way affect the defendant's claim to the disputed 
property. Plaintiffs argued that the settlement agreement proved that the property 
had been mistakenly conveyed, and that plaintiff had accepted the lots in accord 
and satisfaction of his claim. As in Fleet Mortgage Corp., discussed above, the 
court held that the plaintiffs were not parties to the transaction. (The plaintiffs had 
not raised accord and satisfaction as an affirmative defense, but as the basis of 
their claim against defendant.) The court ultimately ruled that plaintiffs claims to 
the property were barred by the statute of limitations. 656 P.2d 974. 
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where one joint tortfeasor is released, regardless of what form that 
release may take, as long as it does not constitute and accord and 
satisfaction or an unqualified or absolute release, and there is no 
manifestation of any intention to the contrary in the agreement, the 
injured party should not be denied his right to pursue the remaining 
wrongdoers until he has received full satisfaction. 
Id. at 807-8 {quoting Gronquist v. Olson, 64 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Minn. 1954) 
(emphasis added). Thus, under Luxemburg, an accord and satisfaction fully discharges 
a dispute and provides protection to those who are not a party to the agreement. 
In short, little or none of the authority cited by Bodell applies to, much less 
supports, its contention that an accord and satisfaction bars tort claims against those 
who are not parties to the agreement. In fact, the lion's share of BodelPs argument is 
directed towards the notion that the trial court should have looked behind the plain 
terms of the Settlement Agreement to determine the parties' intent. 
But this is not the law. "If the court finds the agreement is integrated, then 
parol evidence may be admitted only if the court makes a subsequent determination 
that the language of the agreement is ambiguous." Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 
2008 UT 20 % 11, 182 P.3d 326. In this case, the trial court found the Settlement 
Agreement, which contains an integration clause, to be "unambiguous and clear." (R. 
at 6022.) 
D. The Settlement Agreement Discharges BodelPs Claims 
Against Robbins Despite Utah's Statutory Limitation 
on Discharge of Joint Tortfeasors. 
The Liability Reform Act does not govern the Settlement Agreement because 
the agreement is an accord and satisfaction. The Liability Reform Act, Utah Code 
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Section 78-27-37 to -43, limits the general discharge of persons to those specifically 
identified.7 However, the statute does not apply to all releases. See, e.g., Peterson v. 
Coca-Cola USA, 2002 Utah 42 \ 7, 48 P.3d 941, 945 (holding that, where defendant is 
sued under a theory of vicarious liability, the Joint Obligations Act applies to the 
interpretation of a release); Nelson v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 935 P.2d 512 
(Utah 1997) (holding that the Joint Obligations Act, rather than the Liability Reform 
Act, applies to the discharge of an entity alleged to be vicariously liable for the 
conduct of its agent). See also Jedrziewski v. Smith, 2005 UT 85 f^ 10, 128 P.3d at 
1149 (holding that the comparative fault provision of the Liability Reform Act does 
not implicate civil conspiracy "due to its nature as a cause of action distinguishable, 
independent, and unrelated to tort law"). 
An accord and satisfaction is a particular type of agreement, requiring three 
elements in addition to those of general contract formation. (See § I. A., above.) An 
accord and satisfaction is different than a common release. See Luxenburg v. Can-Tex 
Indus., 257 N.W. 2d 804 (Minn. 1977) (stating that "as long as [a settlement] does not 
constitute an accord and satisfaction, the injured party should not be denied his right 
to pursue the remaining wrongdoers until he has received full satisfaction"). A 
release is "the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could 
have been enforced." Black's Law Dictionary p. 1292 (7th ed. 1999). In contrast, an 
7 The Liability Reform Act provides, in relevant part, that: "A release given by a 
person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not discharge any other 
defendant unless the release so provides." Utah Code § 78-27-42. 
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Section 78-27-37 to -43, limits the general discharge of persons to those specifically 
identified.7 However, the statute does not apply to all releases. See, e.g., Peterson v. 
Coca-Cola USA, 2002 Utah 42 % 7, 48 P.3d 941, 945 (holding that, where defendant is 
sued under a theory of vicarious liability, the Joint Obligations Act applies to the 
interpretation of a release); Nelson v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop, 935 P.2d 512 
(Utah 1997) (holding that the Joint Obligations Act, rather than the Liability Reform 
Act, applies to the discharge of an entity alleged to be vicariously liable for the 
conduct of its agent). See also Jedrziewski v. Smith, 2005 UT 85 f 10, 128 P.3d at 
1149 (holding that the comparative fault provision of the Liability Reform Act does 
not implicate civil conspiracy "due to its nature as a cause of action distinguishable, 
independent, and unrelated to tort law"). 
An accord and satisfaction is a particular type of agreement, requiring three 
elements in addition to those of general contract formation. {See § I. A., above.) An 
accord and satisfaction is different than a common release. See Lwcenburg v. Can-Tex 
Indus., 257 N.W. 2d 804 (Minn. 1977) (stating that "as long as [a settlement] does not 
constitute an accord and satisfaction, the injured party should not be denied his right 
to pursue the remaining wrongdoers until he has received full satisfaction"). A 
release is "the act of giving up a right or claim to the person against whom it could 
have been enforced." Black's Law Dictionary p. 1292 (7th ed. 1999). In contrast, an 
7 The Liability Reform Act provides, in relevant part, that: "A release given by a 
person seeking recovery to one or more defendants does not discharge any other 
defendant unless the release so provides." Utah Code § 78-27-42. 
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accord and satisfaction is a distinct creature that fully disposes of a dispute - not just a 
party - by discharging the entire underlying liability. 
Bodell, MSF and Jenson wholly abrogated the Promissory Note and Guaranty, 
agreed to accept substitute performance as provided in the Settlement Agreement, and 
did, in fact receive the substitute performance. (R. at 3336-37.) The Settlement 
Agreement and the consideration provided by the parties thereto, should be construed 
as an accord and satisfaction, not merely a release, barring Bodell's claims against 
Robbins and Bank One. The Liability Reform Act should not be extended to apply to 
the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. Applying the Utah Liability Reform Act to an 
accord and satisfaction here would effectively swallow the doctrine and unwisely 
limit the ability of parties to negotiate settlements. 
E. The Settlement Agreement Eliminates Any Factual 
Basis for Bodell's Claims Against Robbins. 
The Settlement Agreement extinguishes Bodell's damages. Under Utah law, 
there can only be one satisfaction of a debt or obligation. See Harris-Dudley 
Plumbing Co. v. Prof I United World Travel Assoc, Inc., 592 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 
1979); Blodgett v. Zions First Nat 7 Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 903 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The recitations contained in the Settlement Agreement state that Bodell, MSF, 
and Jenson settled all obligations between them, including the Promissory Note and 
Guaranty. (R. at 3336.) In addition, the Settlement Agreement superseded all prior 
agreements between them. (R. at 3337.) Bodell's damages theory relies exclusively 
on the rights and obligations accorded under the Promissory Note and Guaranty. {See 
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R. at 2994-3030.) Bodell contends that his damages are made up of "the funds 
advanced, together with interest at the legal rate, less payment received from MSF." 
(R. at 2895.) While brought under various theories, damages were related solely to 
the obligations under the Promissory Note and Guaranty. Because those instruments 
were fully settled and superseded, a claim upon them cannot stand. 
Bodell elected its remedy in the form of the promises contained in the 
Settlement Agreement and the satisfaction it received pursuant to those promises. It is 
not entitled to any additional satisfaction on the transaction. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PORTIONS 
OF THE TESTIMONY OF BODELL'S DAMAGES 
EXPERT. 
By order dated August 22, 2007, the trial court properly limited Weight's 
expert testimony to the damages methodology that it had disclosed prior to the close 
of fact discovery. (R. at 4766-69.) In reaching this ruling, the Court explicitly found 
that Bodell had not disclosed its alternate damage theories, could not show good cause 
for its failure to timely disclose its additional damage theories, and that its failure to 
do so prejudiced the Defendants. (See R. at 4766-69.) 
A. Bodell Did Not Timely Disclose the Theories 
upon which Weight Bases His Expert Report 
Prior to the trial court's ruling, Bodell not only had the legal obligation to 
disclose its alternative damage theories but had also been repeatedly asked to do so by 
Defendants. Not only did Bodell fail to disclose its new theories, but it consistently 
reaffirmed its original theory as the sole basis for its damage claims, namely, that its 
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"damages constitutefd] the funds advanced, together with interest at the legal rate, less 
payment received from MSF." (See, e.g., R. at 2895.) 
Bodell never amended nor supplemented its initial disclosures to include new 
damage theories. Bodell also failed to disclose its alternative damage calculations in 
its September 22, 2004 responses to Robbins' first set of discovery requests: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Describe in detail all of the damages 
that you allege you have suffered because of Robbins, giving a detailed 
calculation of how you arrive at such damages and identifying all 
witnesses, documents or other evidence that supports your claim for 
such damages. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Bodell objects to this 
interrogatory upon the ground that it is overbroad and burdensome to 
the extent that it calls for identification of "all witnesses, documents or 
other evidence that supports your claim for such damages." Subject to 
said objection and without waiving the same, Bodell responds as 
follows: See Bodell's response to [Cherokee's] Interrogatory No. 4. 
Bodell has been damaged in the principal sum of $4 million 
representing the amount that Bodell was fraudulently induced to loan 
to MSF to in turn loan those funds to Robbins. Bodell also contends 
that it is entitled to recover interest at the legal rate. Bodell also 
contends that it is entitled to recover punitive damages. The documents 
supporting this calculation of damages have already been produced. 
REQUEST TFOR PRODUCTION! NO. 10: [Please provide] [a]ll 
documents that discuss, memorialize, constitute, demonstrate, or pertain 
to any damages you claim you have suffered. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 10: All non-privileged documents 
within the scope of this request have already been produced. 
(R. at 2923, 2927, emphasis added.) Bodell did not supplement these responses prior 
to the ruling of the trial court. 
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Bodell again failed to disclose its alternative damage calculations on May 24, 
2004, when it served the following responses to Bank One's first set of discovery 
requests. Rather, Bodell merely reiterated its original damage methodology: 
REQUEST TFOR ADMISSION! NO. 7: Admit that if Bodell prevails 
on all claims, the only amounts Bodell is entitled to recover from Bank 
One are the principal amount outstanding on the $4 million Bodell 
Loan, interest on that amount at the rate provided in Utah Code §§ 15-1-
1 and 15-1-4, and costs of court. 
RESPONSE: Bodell admits that at this time he is not seeking punitive 
damages against Bank One. However, discovery is in its infancy and 
Bank One has not been forthcoming with all of the information 
requested. Accordingly, Bodell reserves the right to amend the 
complaint and seek such punitive damages should subsequent discovery 
so justify." 
(R. at 2944.) Bodell even failed to identify its alternative theories when it did choose 
to supplement its prior responses. On August 5, 2004, Bodell served a supplemental 
response to Request for Admission No. 7: 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE: Admit. Discovery is in its infancy 
and Bank One has not been forthcoming with all of the information 
requested. Accordingly, Bodell reserves the right to amend its 
Complaint to seek punitive damages should subsequent discovery 
justify such relief. 
(R. at 2962.) 
Bodell made no further supplementation to its response to Bank One's 
Request for Admission No. 7. 
(R. at 2962.) 
Likewise, when Bodell served its responses to Cherokee's discovery requests, 
it did not disclose any damage theory other than it had originally disclosed: 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State specifically the amount of money 
Bodell contends it is entitled to receive from Cherokee & Walker in this 
action and explain in detail how that amount has been calculated. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Bodell contends it is 
entitled to recover from Cherokee & Walker the principal sum of $4 
million representing the amount that Bodell was fraudulently induced to 
loan to Robbins and by which amount Bodell contends Cherokee & 
Walker was unjustly enriched. Bodell contends it is also entitled to 
recover interest at the legal rate. 
(R. at 2970.) Bodell never supplemented that response, either. 
It was on this record that the trial court ruled that: 
the defendants will suffer prejudice if Bodell were allowed to present , 
[the additional] damages theories at trial because these claims and the 
bases for them were not disclosed during fact discovery and defendants 
are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those theories. Bodell 
has offered no legitimate excuse for not disclosing these theories prior 
to the close of fact discovery. Bodell will only be allowed to present 
evidence at trial on the one theory of damages that was previously 
disclosed, namely, that the damages are $4 million, less payments 
received, plus interest at the statutory rate. 
(R. at 4767.) Utah law makes clear that the trial court did not err in reaching its 
conclusion to exclude portions of Weight's testimony. 
B. The Trial Court's Order Is Reviewed under 
an Abuse of Discretion Standard. 
"With regard to the admissibility of expert testimony, '[t]he trial court has 
wide discretion ... and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard/" Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237 U 12, 74 P.3d 635 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)). Under an abuse of discretion standard, an 
appellate court will not "reverse a decision to admit or exclude expert testimony 
unless the decision 'exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" Id.; see also State v. Hollen, 
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2002 UT 35 f 66, 44 P.3d 794. In other words, "a trial court's decision will be 
overturned only if there was no reasonable basis for the decision." Tschaggeny v. 
Millbank, Ins, Co,, 2007 UT 37 % 163, 16 P.3d 615 (emphasis added); see also State v, 
Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 ^ 101, 63 P.3d 731 (characterizing standard as "no reasonable 
person would take the view adopted by the trial court"); Parker v, Parker, 2000 UT 
App 30 T| 6, 996 P.2d 565 (referring to standard as "highly deferential"); Kunzler v. 
O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("We will not overturn a trial judge's 
determination unless it is so unreasonable that it can be classified as . . . a clear abuse 
of discretion.") 
C. Because Bodell Did Not Comply with Its Disclosure 
Requirements under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Exclusion of Evidence of the Additional 
Damage Theories Was Mandatory. 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party to include as part 
of its initial disclosures, 
a computation of any category of damages claimed by a disclosing 
party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all 
discoverable documents or other evidentiary material on which such 
computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and 
extent of injuries suffered.... 
Rule 37(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further provides: 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as 
required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to 
discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted 
to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the 
failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the 
failure to disclose. 
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Utah R. C. P. 37(f) (emphasis added). Or, as the Advisory Committee phrased it, "[i]f 
a party fails to comply with the disclosure rule, Rule 37(f) requires the court to 
prohibit the use of the witness or evidence at trial unless the failure was harmless or 
there is good cause for the failure." Utah R. Civ. P. 37, advisory committee's note 
(emphasis added). Authorities interpreting the similar federal rule have described the 
sanctions as being "self-executing" and "automatic." See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 37 
advisory committee's note. See also NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Company, 
227 F.3d 776 , 785-86 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 
Bodell seeks to avoid the self-executing nature of Rule 37(f) by arguing that 
that it did, in fact, timely disclose the existence of its additional damage theories. In 
support of this claim, Bodell points to its response to a request for admission in which 
it acknowledged that the only pre-judgment interest it would be seeking was that 
provided by Utah Code Section 15-1-1 which allows parties to a contract to establish 
their own governing rate of interest. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 15-l-l(l)-(2), to which Bodell turns for aid, states: 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of 
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or 
chose in action that is the subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless the parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of 
interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of 
any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum. 
Bodell urges that its discovery responses did not refer to the ten-percent 
statutory default rate, but rather to the contractual rate of interest in the Promissory 
Note between Bodell and MSF. Significantly, Bodell fails to note the dispositive 
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point that Defendants were not parties to the contract. The plain-language of the 
statute does not empower a party to a contract to enforce an interest rate agreed upon 
between parties to a contract upon a third party. A non-party to an agreement is not 
bound by an agreement among other parties for a rate of interest other than the default 
legal rate. While Utah law appears not to have specifically addressed the issue, courts 
in other jurisdictions have interpreted similar statutes in this manner. See, e.g., Taylor 
v. Okatie Hotel Group, 641 S.E.2d 459,464 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that suit to 
enforce lien by subcontractor against owner and general contractor that owner was 
bound to statutory, not contractual, interest rate, where only general contractor and 
subcontractor agreed to higher interest rate); Cassacia v. Habel, 303 N.E.2d 548, 551 
(111. App. Ct. 1973) (holding homeowner subject only to statutory, not contractual, 
rate of interest in action for unlawful detainer where lender held home in trust and 
extended loan to homeowner by borrowing money from another source at a high 
interest rate through contract with a third-party lender). 
BodelFs after-the-fact attempt to expand its damage theory to encompass more 
than it originally identified is without merit. Prior to the Weight Report, Bodell 
disclosed only one damage theory. Thus, under the self-executing character of Rule 
37(f), the new theories advanced in the Weight Report must be excluded. 
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D. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion When It 
Concluded that Bodell Did Not Show that It Had Good 
Cause for Its Failure to Disclose Its Additional Damage 
Theories or that the Failure Was Harmless* 
In order to overcome the mandatory exclusion requirement of Rule 37(f), it is 
the dilatory party's burden to demonstrate that it had good cause for its failure to 
disclose or that the failure was harmless. The trial court was well within its broad 
discretion when it concluded that Bodell had failed to demonstrate either. 
The burden to demonstrate that it had good cause for its failure to comply with 
the disclosure and supplementation requirements falls squarely on Bodell. See Utah 
R. Civ. Pro. 37(f). On this point, Bodell appears to have all but acquiesced, devoting 
only one footnote to the issue in its brief. There, Bodell argues little more than that 
the approach it took was "typical." (Bodell's Brief at 28 n. 12.) Whether a practice is 
typical is, however, not the test of whether it comports with the law and cannot form a 
reasonable basis to set aside the Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court was not 
persuaded by this argument, and its conclusion can in no way be said to 'exceed[] the 
limits of reasonability.'" Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App. 237 ^ 12, 74 P.3d 635. 
Bodell also bore the burden of convincing the trial court that its failure to 
disclose was harmless. See Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 
1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001); Design Strategies, Inc. v. Davis, 367 F. Supp. 2d.630, 635 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).8 However, Bodell did not meet this burden. It hardly seems 
8 "Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are persuasive where the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 'substantially similar' to the federal rules. 
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controversial that "a defendant is entitled to know which method [of damages] ... 
plaintiff is choosing in this case, and to know in time to prepare a defense." Precision 
Seed Co. v. Consol Grain & Barge Co., Docket No.3:03-CV-079, 2006 WL 1281689, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29520 *17 (S.D. Ohio May 6, 2006) (striking new damages 
theories not previously disclosed). In order to adequately prepare his case for trial, 
Robbins would need to conduct significant fact discovery on Bodell's late-hour 
disclosure of its additional three damage theories. At the very minimum, Robbins 
would need to conduct discovery on Bodell's loan history and the loan histories and 
practices of those to whom Bodell could and would allegedly loaned money in lieu of 
MSF. He would need to conduct discovery, through MSF, Jenson, and third parties, 
as to the capabilities of MSF and Jenson to repay or obtain financing to repay the $4 
million loan at the time the loan was made. He would also have to conduct discovery, 
including discovery of non-party financial institutions, regarding Bodell's expenses, 
investments, and credit history. Of course, inquiry into these areas almost certainly 
would lead to several new avenues of discovery that would need to be explored. 
Bodell would have to do this and probably more. But fact discovery was closed. 
Bodell's failure to disclose its damage theories until after the close of fact discovery 
would have severely prejudiced Robbins if the trial court had not excluded the new 
damage theories. Accordingly, the trial court's decision to exclude portions of 
Weight's expert testimony should be affirmed. 
Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 2002 UT 54 f 7 n.2, 53 P.3d 947 (citations 
omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth here, Robbins urges this Court to affirm the judgment 
of the trial court in dismissing the claims asserted against Robbins and affirming the 
order of the trial court in excluding portions of Weight's expert testimony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on June 2, 2008. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
By: S * — 
Andrew G. Deiss 
Billie J. Siddoway 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Mark K Robbins 
842261.1 
31 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 2nd day of June, 2008, two true 
and correct copies of Brief of Appellee Mark H. Robbins were served by hand-
delivery to each of the following: 
James S. Jardine 
Matthew R. Lewis 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Bodell Construction Company 
John A. Beckstead 
Douglas Owens 
HOLLAND & HART 
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Bank One Utah 
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ADDENDUM 
Reproduction of opinions appealed: 
A. Revised Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment 
of 11/5/07 (R. at 6020-25) 
B. Order Granting Mark Robbins' Motion to Exclude Expert 
Testimony of Merrill Weight of 8/22/07 (R. at 4766-69) 
Reproduction of contract at issue: 
C. Promissory Note (R. at 2238-39) 
D. Guaranty (R. at 2240-42) 
E. Settlement Agreement (R. at 3336-38) 
Reproduction of determinative statutes, or rules: 
F. Utah Code §15-1-1 
G. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 26 
H. Utah R. Civ. Pro. 37 
Reproduction of unpublished opinions: 
I. Precision Seed Co. v. Consol. Grain & Barge Co., Docket 
No.3:03-CV-079, 2006 WL 1281689, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 29520 *17 (S.D. Ohio May 6,2006) 
842261.1 
2 
Tab A 
John A. Beckstead, #0263 
H. Douglas Owens, #7762 
Romaine C. Marshall, #9654 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031 
Telephone: (801)799-5800 
Fax: (801)799-5700 
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 
as successor to Bank One, N.A. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & 
WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE & WALKER, L.L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company; BANK ONE, 
UTAH, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, a 
national banking association, and DOES 1 
through 50, 
Defendant. 
! REVISED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030917018 
Hon. John Paul Kennedy 
The following Motions for Summary Judgment were filed in this action: 
1. Motion of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. for Partial Summary Judgment on Fraud 
Claim dated November 29, 2006 (the "Fraud Summary Judgment Motion"). 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 0 5 IM? 
SALT LMAt y c < U 4 i i 
By _ _ U 
Deputy Clerk 
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2. Mark Robbins Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 29, 2007 (the 
"Robbins Motion"). 
3. Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Fraud and Negligent 
Misrepresentation Claims dated July 2, 2007 (the "Bank One Motion"). 
4. Joinder in Defendant Bank One's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs 
Fraud Claims dated July 9, 2007 (the "Robbins Joinder"). 
Hearing on the Fraud Summary Judgment Motion was held before this Court on April 6, 
2007 and the Motion was taken under advisement. 
Hearing on the Bank One Motion and the Robbins Motion was held before this Court on 
September 10, 2007. At that time, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental memoranda 
on the issue of the Court's authority to reconsider the order previously entered by Judge William 
Bohling and scheduled further oral argument. 
The further oral argument was held October 3, 2007. Appearing at that argument were 
James Jardine and Matthew Lewis of Ray Quinney & Nebeker on behalf of Bodell Construction 
Company ("Bodell"), John A. Beckstead and Douglas Owens of Holland & Hart on behalf of 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Bank One, N.A. ("Bank One"), and David 
W. Tufts and Jason R. Hull of Durham Jones & Pinegar and Andrew Deiss of Jones Waldo 
Holbrook & McDonough on behalf of Defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins"). 
Having reviewed the Memoranda and Exhibits filed by the parties in support of and in 
opposition to these Motions, and having heard the arguments of counsel, and good cause 
appearing, the Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows: 
3772177_6.DOC 2 
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1. The Court finds that it has authority to reconsider an earlier order of the Court 
where there is a basis to believe the earlier order is in error and final judgment has not been 
entered. The Court finds that the Order dated March 15, 2004 entered by the Hon. William 
Bohling is in error and it is therefore proper for this Court to reconsider the accord and 
satisfaction arguments which were the subject of the March 15, 2004 Order. 
2. The Bank One Motion is hereby granted. The ground upon which the Bank One 
Motion is granted is that the Settlement Agreement dated March 18, 2003, between Bodell 
Construction Company, Michael Bodell, MSF Properties, LC, and Marc S. Jenson (the 
"Settlement Agreement") constitutes an accord and satisfaction and the Court makes the 
following findings, together with findings stated in the record: 
a. The Settlement Agreement is unambiguous and clear. 
b. The Settlement Agreement includes the settlement of liquidated and 
unliquidated claims. 
c. The Settlement Agreement was drafted by lawyers and the parties are 
sophisticated businessmen. 
d. The Settlement Agreement is an accord and satisfaction. 
e. The existence of an accord and satisfaction is shown within the "four 
corners" of the Settlement Agreement. 
f. An accord and satisfaction operates for the benefit of third parties and 
encompasses all claims pending before the Court, including the claims for fraud and negligent 
3772177_6.DOC 
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misrepresentation asserted against Bank One and the claims for fraud, civil conspiracy, and 
unjust enrichment asserted against Robbins. 
3. The Court finds that Robbins has properly joined in the Bank One Motion. All of 
the bases for granting the Bank One Motion with respect to the claims asserted against Bank One 
apply to the claims asserted against Robbins. 
4. The Court declines to rule on the other arguments in the Bank One Motion, in the 
Robbins Motion, and in the Fraud Summary Judgment Motion. 
5. The trial date of October 22, 2007, and all other dates and deadlines set by the 
Court are hereby vacated. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: November J> , 2007. 
Approved as to form: 
S. Jard 
fatthew R. Lewis 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company 
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David W\ TVifts 
Jason R Hull 
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P C 
Attorneys for Defendant Mark H Robbins 
John A B^ckstead 
H Douglas Owens 
Romaine C Marshall 
Holland & Hart LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N A, successor by merger to Bank One, N A 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on November >£ , 2007,1 served a copy of the foregoing document to the 
following by: 
James S. Jardine 
Matthew L. Lewis 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 S. State Street #1400 
P. O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
David W. Tufts 
Jason R. Hull 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
P. (X Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050 
James S. Lowrie 
Andrew G. Deiss 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Email 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Email 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Email 
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David W. Tufts (8736) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
Jason R.Hull (11202) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
P.O. Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050 
(801)415-3000 
(801) 415-3500 fax 
Attorneys for defendant Mark H. Robbins 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK H. ROBBINS; CHEROKEE & WALKER INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company; 
CHEROKEE AND WALKER, L.L.C., a 
Utah limited liability company; BANK 
ONE, UTAH, National Association, a Utah 
corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF 
MERRILL WEIGHT 
Case No. 030917018 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
On July 27, 2007, at 9:00 a.m., the Court heard oral arguments on (1) Defendant Mark 
Robbins' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill Weight; and (2) Defendant Mark 
Robbins' Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Defendant JPMorgan 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 2 2 2007 
Deputy Clerk 
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Chase Bank, N A , successor by merger to Bank One, N A ("Bank One") joined in both of these 
motions Robert J Shelby of Burbidge Mitchell & Gross appeared on behalf of Bodell 
Construction Company ("Bodell") H Douglas Owens of Holland & Hart LLP appeared on 
behalf of Bank One David W Tufts and lason R Hull of Durham Jones & Pinegar PC appeared 
on behalf of Defendant Mark Robbins ("Robbins") Having reviewed the papers filed by the 
parties in support and opposition to these motions, and having heard the arguments of counsel, 
and good cause appeanng, the Court hereby FINDS and ORDERS as follows 
1 Motion to Exclude Weight Robbins' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of 
Merrill Weight is GRANTED Bodell will not be allowed to present testimony at trial to 
support those claims for damages that are advanced in the expert leport of Merrill Weight 
relating to the Benefit of the Bargain theory, the Modified Benefit of the Bargain theory, the 
Reasonable Rate of Return theory, and claims for Consequential Damages The Court holds that 
the defendants will suffer prejudice if Bodell were allowed to present these damages theories at 
trial because these claims and the bases for them were not disclosed during fact discovery and 
defendants are now unable to conduct fact discovery to rebut those theories Bodell has offered 
no legitimate excuse for not disclosing these theories prior to the close of fact discovery Bodell 
will only be allowed to present evidence at tnal on the one theory of damages that was 
previously disclosed, namely, that the damages are $4 million, less payments received, plus 
interest at the statutory rate BodelFs ability to seek punitive damages, attorneys fees, and costs 
under this theory of damages for the alleged fraud was not considered by the Court in this motion 
and is therefore not precluded by this order 
SLC 104492 2 
The Court declines to reach the questions of the legal and factual viability of the 
various theories asserted by Mr. Weight. Those issues were briefed, but the Court finds that it is 
unnecessary to rule on those issues at this time in light of the Court's decision to exclude the 
testimony of Mr Weight on the grounds described above. 
2. Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines. Robbins' 
Motion to Reopen Fact Discovery and Extend Expert Deadlines was asserted in the alternative 
and is moot because the Court has granted the Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Merrill 
Weight. 
3. Other Issues. Bodell is permitted to provide a revised expert report from Merrill 
Weight on the damage theory that Plaintiff Bodell Construction Company is entitled to $4 
million, less payments received, plus interest at the statutory rate. Mr. Weight's revised expert 
report shall be served on the defendants not later than Friday, August 3, 2007. Thereafter, 
defendants shall have until August 31, 2007, to depose Mr. Weight and to serve rebuttal reports 
to Mr. Weight's revised expert report. Bodell shall have until September 14, 2007, to depose this 
expert designated by the defendants. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: August 2^2007. 
Approved as to form: 
Robert J. Shelby 
Burbidge & Mitttfell 
A. Beckstead 
I. Douglas Owens 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Bodell Construction Co. Holland & Hart 
Attorneys for Defendant Bank One, N. A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this x'J day of August, 2007,1 caused a copy of the within and 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING MARK ROBBINS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
TESTIMONY OF MERRILL WEIGHT to be delivered via hand delivery to the following-
Richard D. Burbidge 
Robert Shelby 
Burbidge Mitchell & Gross 
215 South State Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
John A. Beckstead 
H. Douglas Owens 
Romaine C. Marshall 
Holland & Hart LLP 
60 E. South temple, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -1031 
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
$4,000,000.00 August 30, 2000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
1. Promise to Pay. For value received, MSF PROPERTIES, 
L.C., a Utah Limited Liability Company, (hereinafter Maker"), 
promises to pay to the order of Bodell Construction Company, a 
Utah Corporation and its successors and assigns (hereinafter 
"Payee"), at 586 Fine Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, or at 
such other place as Payee may from time to time designate, in 
lawful money of the United States of America, the principal sum 
of FOUR MILLION DOLLARS AND NO/CENTS ($4,000,000.00), plus 
interest as computed below. Maker also agrees to pay $80,000.00 
as a loan fee, payable on the due date of this note. 
2. Interest. The outstanding balance of the Principal 
Indebtedness shall bear interest from the date hereof at the rate 
of ONE PERCENT (1.0%) per week, or any portion of a week for 
which any principal balance is outstanding. Interest shall 
accrue weekly on the outstanding balance of the Principal 
Indebtedness at the start of the week. 
3. Interest and Payments. The total Principal 
Indebtedness and all accrued and unpaid interest thereon and the 
loan fee shall be due and payable in full on or before September 
30, 2000. 
4. Late Charge. If Maker fails to make any payment of 
interest or principal within fifteen (15) days from the date on 
which the same is due and payable, a late charge with respect to 
such payment shall be due and payable to cover, in part, the 
extra expense of handling such delinquent payment. Such late 
charge shall be equal to one percent (1%) of such payment. 
5. Prepayment. Maker reserves the right to prepay all or 
part of the Principal Indebtedness owing on this Promissory Note 
at any time or times prior to maturity without notice and without 
payment of any premium or penalty. 
6. Application of Payments. Any and all payments by Maker 
under this Promissory Note shall be applied as follows: First, to 
the payment of any late charges; Second, to the payment of 
accrued interest on the Principal Indebtedness; Third, to the 
payment of the Principal Indebtedness, and Finally to the payment 
of the loan fee. 
7. Extension. The time for any payment required hereunder 
may be extended from time to time at the election o£ Paye^T"" 
1 
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Acceptance by Payc of additional security or
 bgrantees for the 
performance of the terms and provisions herein contained shall 
not in any way affect the liability of Maker. 
8. Default. If Maker fails (a) to pay any suras herein 
specified when due where such default is not cured, or (b) to 
perform any obligation provided to be satisfied or performed 
under any instrument given to secure payment of the obligations 
evidenced hereby if not satisfied or performed at the time and in 
the manner required, the entire unpaid Principal Indebtedness, 
together with all accrued and unpaid interest thereon, plus any 
unpaid loan fee shall, at the election of Payee, become 
immediately due and payable, and any sum not so paid when due 
shall bear interest at the interest rate provided in Paragraph 2 
above plus zero percent (0%) per annum, both before and after 
judgement. In addition thereto, there shall be due and payable 
all reasonable costs of collection or other Costs incurred in th£ 
protection of the interests of Payee, including, but not limited 
to, reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by Payee if this 
Promissory Note is referred to an attorney for collection. 
9. Governing Law. This Promissory Note is to be construed 
in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
10. Successors and Assigns. Except as otherwise provided 
herein, the provisions hereof shall inure to the benefit of, and 
be binding upon, the successors, assigns, heirs, executors and 
administrators of the parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Promissory Note has been duly 
executed as of this 3Oh day of August, 2 000. 
MSF Properties, L.C. 
/v\/Vzc T ^ ^ ^ j (A^^^~ 
P^int name and title 
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GUARANTY 
This Guaranty is made as of the 30th day of August, 2000, by Marc S. Jenson 
("Guarantor'1), whose notice address is 5326 S. Northwood Rd., Salt Lake City, Utah and 
Bodell Construction Company ("Lender"), whose notice address is 586 West Fine Drive, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84115. 
WITNESSETH 
WHEREAS, simultaneously with the delivery of this Guaranty, the Lender has extended 
a loan ("Loan") to MSF Properties, L.C., (the "Borrower") pursuant to a Promissory Note 
(referred to collectively as the Loan Documents) in the principal amount of Four Million 
Dollars (S 4,000,000.00); and 
WHEREAS, this Agreement is executed and delivered to the Lender by the Guarantor to 
induce the lender to make the Loan and in satisfaction of a material condition precedent to such 
extension of credit by the Lender to Borrower, 
NOW, THEREFORE, is consideration of the Loan by the Lender to the Borrower and 
the benefits to be derived by the Guarantor therefrom, it is agreed as follows: 
i. The Guarantor unconditionally guarantees to the lender the following (hereinafter 
referred to collectively as the "Obligations'1): the full and prompt payment by 
Borrower, in lawful money of the United States, when due, whether at maturity or by 
acceleration or otherwise, of all of the Borrower's present and future indebtedness 
and obligations under the Promissory Note and all modifications, extensions and 
renewal thereof, whether for principal, interest or otherwise, and whether absolute or 
contingent, primary or secondary. 
2. The Obligations of the Guarantor hereunder are primary, absolute, unconditional, 
continuing guaranty of payment and performance by the Guarantor and will not 
terminate until the Borrower has paid in full all amounts owing to the Lender and has 
performed all of the Borrower's obligations under the Loan Documents. 
3. The Guarantor agrees that the Guarantor's liability hereunder will not be released, 
reduced, impaired or affected by any one or more of the following events: the 
assumption of liability by any other person (whether as guarantor or otherwise) for 
payment or performance under the Loan Documents: the subordination, 
relinquishment or discharge of the Lender's rights relating to the Loan Documents; 
the full or partial release from liability of the Borrower or any other person now or 
hereafter liable for payment or performance under the Loan Documents; the 
insolvency, bankruptcy, reorganization, discharge, waiver or other exoneration of the 
Borrower or any other person now or hereafter liable or payment or performance 
under the Loan Documents; the renewal consolidation, extension, modification, 
rearrangements or amendment from time to time of the Note; the failure, delay, 
waiver or refusal by the Lender to exercise any right or remedy held by the Lender 
under the Loan Documents; the sale, encumbrance, transfer or other modification of 
CW000299 
condition or nnanagement of the Borrower, the inv°l»ditv, unenforceability or 
insufficiency -sxy one or more of the Loan Doa or the failure of the 
Guarantor to receive notice of any one or more of the foregoing actions or events. 
4. The Lender may, at the Lender's option, upon the occurrence of any failure of 
performance by the Borrower, proceed to enforce this Agreement directly against the 
Guarantor without first proceeding against the Borrower. 
5. Guarantor waives diligence, presentment, protest, notice of dishonor, demand for 
payment, notice of nonpayment or nonperformance, notice of acceptance of this 
Agreement and all other notice of any nature. Guarantor agrees that any rights which 
the Guarantor might now or hereafter hold against the Borrower will be subordinate, 
junior and inferior to all rights which the Lender might now or hereafter hold against 
the Borrower. 
6. Guarantor agrees that in any action brought to enforce this Agreement, the Guarantor 
will pay to the Lender the reasonable attorney's fees, court costs and other expenses 
incurred by the Lender. 
7. In the event of any Default under the Loan Documents or any default under this 
Agreement, the Lender will be entitled to selectively and successively enforce any 
one or more of the rights held by the Lender and such action will not be deemed a 
waiver of any other right held by the Lender. All of the remedies of the Lender under 
this Agreement and the Loan Department are cumulative and not alternative. 
8. This Agreement has been negotiated and delivered in Salt Lake City, and is intended 
to be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. The Guarantor 
hereby irrevocably waives all rights to trial by jury in any action, proceeding or 
counterclaim arising out of or relating to this Guaranty. 
9. If any provision of this Agreement is held to be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in 
any respect or application for any reason, such invalidity, illegality or 
unenforceability will not effect any other provisions herein contained and such 
provisions will remain in full force and effect 
10. This Agreement cannot be amended except by an agreement in writing signed by the 
Guarantor and the Lender. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Guarantor has duly executed this instrument the date 
first above written. 
MarkJMqisoj 
CW000300 
STATE OF UTAF ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing bstrument was acknowledged before me this J O day of 
2000 by: ~ J 
Notary Public p 
My Commission Expires: Crl'dOoQ 
KABUV-SPHOUL , 
SiftUbCX/.UtahMflS . 
MyCo<nffl2»feA&pbu I 
Jur»7,»04 
State of Utah I 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (tins {KAgrecmcnC) is entered into this 18th day of March, 
2003, by and among BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a Utah corporation ("BCC"), MICHAEL 
BODELL, an individual ("Bodcir), MARC S. JENSON, an individual ("Jenson"), and MSF 
PROPERTIES, L.C, a Utah limited liability company ("MSF71) 
WHEREAS, in June and August of 2000, BCC made certain loans to MSF (the "Loans"); and 
WHEREAS, Jenson personally guaranteed the obligations of MSF under the Loans; and 
WHEREAS, MSF has made partial payments against the amounts outstanding under the Loans, 
but is currently in'default under the Loans; and 
WHEREAS, the parties now desire to achieve a full settlement of all obligations, disputes and 
other matters outstanding between them, including, but not limited to the Loans; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth above and the covenants and 
obligations set forth below, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of 
which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereby agree as follows; 
1. Contemporaneous with the execution and delivery of this Agreement, MSF has caused 
$3,000,000 in immediately available funds to be delivered to BCC. BCC hereby acknowledges receipt of 
such funds. 
2. Each of BodeJLand BCC, for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities 
claiming by, through or under him, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges 
MSF, its affiliates and dieir respective members, managers, officers, employees and agents (each, 
including without limitation Jenson, an "MSF Patty") from any and all claims, allegations of fraud, 
charges, demands, losses, damages, obligations, liabilities, grievances, causes of action, or suits at law 
and equity of whatsoever kind and nature, expenses, costs and attorneys fees, whether known or unknown, 
suspected or unsuspected, liquidated or unliquidated (each, a "Cfcrfm"), arising out of all past affiliations 
and transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party, including, but not limited to, the Loans and all 
related arrangements and transactions, (b) without limiting the generality of the foregoing, acknowledges 
and agrees that the obligations of the MSF Parties in connection with the Loans, including all principal 
and interest that may have been deemed to have accrued thereon, are hereby deemed fully satisfied and 
repaid in foil; provided that suoh releases shall not apply to any obligation of MSF or Jenson set forth in 
tins Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery hereof* 
3. Each of Jenson and MSF, for himself, itself, their affiliates and for all persons or entities 
claiming by, through or under biro, it or them, hereby (a) releases, acquits, waives and forever discharges 
BCC, its affiliates and their respective officers, directors, employees and agents (each, including without 
limitation Bodell, a "Bodell Partf})% from any and all Claims arising out of all past affiliations and 
transactions among Bodell, BCC and any MSF Party including, but not limited to, the Loans and all 
related arrangements and transactions; provided that such releases shajl not apply to any obligation of 
BCC or Bodell set forth in this Agreement to be performed or observed after the execution and delivery 
hereof. 
4. Each of the parties be/eto agrees that, except as necessary to enforce the provisions hereof; it 
shall keep confidential the execution, terms and existence of this Agreement, the consideration exchanged 
herein, and all other matters in connection with this Agreement; provided that any party may (upon 
performance by the parties of the respective deliveries to be made hereunder) disclose that MSF. Jenson 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of tho date first set forth 
above. 
"Bodell": 
k>XJMw_ 
Michael Bodell 
"BCCM 
Bodell Construction Company 
e: 
Bv 
Nam ; hltfimjL-j; &&&X-
Title: t£8&&3Vr 
"Jenson": 
"MSF": 
MSF Properties, L.C. 
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601 CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL 15-3-3 
15-11 Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate. 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any 
rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, 
or chose in action that is the subject of their contract 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different 
rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or 
forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 
10% per annum 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to 
affect any penalty or interest charge that by law applies to 
delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations 
made before May 14, 1981 1989 
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. R e p e a l e d . 1969 
15-1-3 C a l c u l a t e d by t h e year . 
Whenever in anv statute or deed or written or verbal 
contract, or in any public or private instrument whatever, any 
certain rate of interest is mentioned and no period of time is 
stated, interest shall be calculated at the rate mentioned by 
the year 1953 
15-1-4. I n t e r e s t on j u d g m e n t s . 
(1) As used in this section, "federal postjudgment interest 
rate" means the interest rate established for the federal court 
system under 28 U S C Sec 1961, as amended 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2Kb), a judgment 
rendered on a lawful contract shall conform to the con-
tract and shall bear the interest agreed upon by the 
parties, which shall be specified in the judgment 
(b) A judgment rendered on a deferred deposit loan 
subject to Title 7, Chapter 23, Check Cashing Registra 
tion Act, shall bear interest a t the rate imposed under 
Subsection (3) on an amount not exceeding the sum of 
d) the total of the principal balance of the deferred 
deposit loan, 
(n) interest at the rate imposed by the deferred 
deposit loan agreement for a period not exceeding 12 
weeks as provided in Subsection 7-23-105(4), 
(in) costs, 
(IV) attorney fees, and 
(v) other amounts allowed by law and ordered by 
the court 
(3) (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, other civil and 
cnmmal judgments of the district court and justice court 
shall bear interest at the federal postjudgment interest 
rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2% 
(b) The postjudgment interest rate in effect a t the time 
of the judgment shall remain the interest ra te for the 
duration of the judgment 
(c) The interest on criminal judgments shall be calcu-
lated on the total amount of the judgment 
(d) Interest paid on state revenue shall be deposited m 
accordance with Section 63A-8-301 
(e) Interest paid on revenue to a county or municipality 
shall be paid to the general fund of the county or munic-
ipality 2006 
15-1-5 t o 15-1-10. R e p e a l e d . 1955,1969 
C H A P T E R 2 
LEGAL CAPACITY O F C H I L D R E N 
Section 
1S-2-L Period of minority 
*M-2 Liability for necessaries and on contracts — Disaf-
**- firmance 
j**2-3 Limitation on right to disaffirm 
*j«-4* Payment for personal services 
# • 2 - 5 Blood donation by minor 
15-2-1 P e r i o d of minor i t y . 
The period of minority extends in males and females to the 
age of eighteen years, but all minors obtain their majority by 
marriage It is further provided that courts in divorce actions 
may order support to age 21 1975 
15-2-2. L iab i l i ty for n e c e s s a r i e s a n d on c o n t r a c t s — 
Disaf f i rmance . 
A minor is bound not only for reasonable value of neces-
saries but also by his contracts, unless he disaffirms them 
before or within a reasonable time after he attains his major-
ity and restores to the other party all money or property 
received by him by virtue of said contracts and remaining 
within his control a t any time after attaining his majority 
1953 
15-2-3 L i m i t a t i o n on r i g h t t o disaff irm. 
No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases where, on 
account of the mmor's own misrepresentations as to his 
majority or from his having engaged m busmess as adult, the 
other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of 
contracting 1953 
15-2-4. P a y m e n t for p e r s o n a l s e rv i ce s . 
When a contract for the personal services of a minor has 
been made with him alone, and those services are afterward 
performed, payment made therefor to such minor m accor-
dance with the terms of the contract is a full satisfaction for 
those services, and the parent or guardian cannot recover 
therefor a second time 1953 
15-2-5. Blood d o n a t i o n by minor . 
Notwithstanding any other provision of the law, any minor 
who has reached the age of eighteen years may give consent to 
the donation of his blood and to the necessary medical proce-
dures to accomplish such donation Consent shall not be 
subject to disaffirmance because of minority The consent of 
the parent or parents of a minor shall not be necessary in 
order to authorize the donation of blood and such medical 
procedures 1971 
CHAPTER 3 
7NTERPARTY AGREEMENTS 
Section 
15-3-1 Conveyances, releases, sales by persons actmg 
jointly 
15-3-2 Contracts not discharged by merger in obligor and 
obligee 
15-3-3 Fraudulent transactions not validated 
15-3-4 Effective date of chapter 
15-3-1. C o n v e y a n c e s , r e l e a s e s , s a l e s b y p e r s o n s ac t ing 
jo in t ly . 
A conveyance, release or sale may be made to or by two or 
more persons acting jointly and one or more, but less than all, 
of these persons acting either by himself or themselves or with 
other persons, and a contract may be made between such 
parties 1953 
15-3-2. C o n t r a c t s n o t d i s c h a r g e d b y m e r g e r in obl igor 
and . ob l igee . 
No contract shall be discharged because after its formation 
the obligation and the right thereunder become vested in the 
same person, acting m different capacities as to the right and 
the obhgation 1953 
15-3-3. F r a u d u l e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s n o t val idated. 
Nothing herein shall validate a transaction within its pro-
visions which is actually or constructively fraudulent 1953 
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ting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is 
sought. 
(d) Constitutionality of statutes and ordinances. 
(dXD If a party challenges the constitutionality of a 
statute in an action in which the Attorney General has 
not appeared, the party raising the question of consti-
tutionality shall notify the Attorney General of such 
fact. The court shall permit the state to be heard upon 
timely application. 
(dX2) If a party challenges the constitutionality of a 
county or municipal ordinance in an action in which 
the county or municipal attorney has not appeared, the 
party raising the question of constitutionality shall 
notify the county or municipal attorney of such fact. 
The court shall permit the county or municipality to be 
heard upon timely application. 
(dX3) Failure of a party to provide notice as required 
by this rule is not a waiver of any constitutional 
challenge otherwise timely asserted. 
Rule 25. Subst i tut ion of part ies . 
(a) Death. 
(aXl) If a party dies and the claim is not thereby 
extinguished, the court may order substitution of the 
proper parties. The motion for substitution may be 
made by any party or by the successors or representa-
tives of the deceased party and, together with the 
notice of hearing, shall be served on the parties as 
provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not parties in the 
manner provided in Rule 4 for the service of a sum-
mons. Unless the motion for substitution is made not 
later than ninety days after the death is suggested 
upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of 
the death as provided herein for the service of the 
motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the de-
ceased party. 
(aX2) In the event of the death of one or more of the 
plaintiffs or of one or more of the defendants in an 
action in which the right sought to be enforced survives 
only to the surviving plaintiffs or only against the 
surviving defendants, the action does not abate. The 
death shall be suggested upon the record and the 
action shall proceed in favor of or against the surviving 
parties. 
(b) Incompetency. If a party becomes incompetent, 
the court upon motion served as provided in Subdivi-
sion (a) of this rule may allow the action to be contin-
ued by or against his representative. 
(c) Transfer of interest. In case of any transfer of 
interest, the action may be continued by or against the 
original party, unless the court upon motion directs the 
person to whom the interest is transferred to be 
substituted in the action or joined with the original 
party. Service of the motion shall be made as provided 
in Subdivision (a) of this rule. 
(d) Public officers; death or separation from office. 
When a public officer is a party to an action and during 
its pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold 
office, the action may be continued and maintained by 
or against his successor, if within 6 months after the 
successor takes office, it is satisfactorily shown to the 
court that there is a substantial need for so continuing 
and maintaining it. Substitution pursuant to this rule 
may be made when it is shown by supplemental 
pleading that the successor of an officer adopts or 
continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action 
of his predecessor. Before a substitution is made, the 
party or officer to be affected, unless expressly assent-
ing thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the 
application therefor and accorded an opportunity to 
object. 
PART V. DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY 
Rule 26. General provis ions governing discov-
ery. 
(a) Required disclosures; Discovery methods. 
(aXD Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt 
under Subdivision (aX2) and except as otherwise stip-
ulated or directed by order, a party shall, without 
awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties: 
(aXIXA) the name and, if known, the address and 
telephone number of each individual likely to have 
discoverable information supporting its claims or de-
fenses, unless solely for impeachment, identifying the 
subjects of the information; 
(aXIXB) a copy of, or a description by category and 
location of, all discoverable documents, data compila-
tions, electronically stored information, and tangible 
things in the possession, custody, or control of the party 
supporting its claims or defenses, unless solely for 
impeachment; 
(aXlXC) a computation of any category of damages 
claimed by the disclosing party, making available for 
inspection and copying as under Rule 34 all discover-
able documents or other evidentiary material on which 
such computation is based, including materials bear-
ing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and 
(aXIXD) for inspection and copying as under Rule 
34 any insurance agreement under which any person 
carrying on an insurance business may be liable to 
satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered 
in the case or to indemnify or reimburse for payments 
made to satisfy the judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or or-
dered by the court, the disclosures required by Subdi-
vision (aXD shall be made within 14 days after the 
meeting of the parties under Subdivision (f). Unless 
otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the 
court, a party joined after the meeting of the parties 
shall make these disclosures within 30 days after being 
served. A party shall make initial disclosures based on 
the information then reasonably available and is not 
excused from making disclosures because the party 
has not fully completed the investigation of the case or 
because the party challenges the sufficiency of another 
party's disclosures or because another party has not 
made disclosures. 
(aX2) Exemptions. 
(aX2XA) The requirements of Subdivision (aXD and 
Subdivision (f) do not apply to actions: 
(aX2XAXi) based on contract in which the amount 
demanded in the pleadings is $20,000 or less; 
(aX2XAXii) for judicial review of adjudicative pro-
ceedings or rule making proceedings of an administra-
tive agency; 
(aX2XAXiii) governed by Rule 65B or Rule 65C; 
(aX2XAXiv) to enforce an arbitration award; 
(aX2XAXv) for water rights general adjudication 
under Title 73, Chapter 4; and 
(aX2XAXvi) in which any party not admitted to 
practice law in Utah is not represented by counsel. 
(aX2XB) In an exempt action, the matters subject to 
disclosure under subpart (aXD are subject to discovery 
under subpart (b). 
(aX3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
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(aX3XA) A party shall disclose to other parties the 
identity of any person who may be used at trial to 
present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(aX3XB) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties 
or ordered by the court, this disclosure shall, with 
respect to a witness who is retained or specially em-
ployed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose 
duties as an employee of the party regularly involve 
giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written 
report prepared and signed by the witness or party. 
The report shall contain the subject matter on which 
the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the 
facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to 
testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the 
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all 
publications authored by the witness within the pre-
ceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the 
study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in 
which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or 
by deposition within the preceding four years. 
(aX3XC) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties 
or ordered by the court, the disclosures required by 
Subdivision (aX3) shall be made within 30 days after 
the expiration of fact discovery as provided by Subdi-
vision (d) or, if the evidence is intended solely to 
contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject mat-
ter identified by another party under paragraph (3XB), 
within 60 days after the disclosure made by the other 
party. 
(aX4) Pretrial disclosures. A party shall provide to 
other parties the following information regarding the 
evidence that it may present at trial other than solely 
for impeachment: 
(aX4XA) the name and, if not previously provided, 
the address and telephone number of each witness, 
separately identifying witnesses the party expects to 
present and witnesses the party may call if the need 
arises; 
(aX4XB) the designation of witnesses whose testi-
mony is expected to be presented by means of a 
deposition and, if not taken stenographically, a tran-
script of the pertinent portions of the deposition testi-
mony; and 
(aX4XC) an appropriate identification of each docu-
ment or other exhibit, including summaries of other 
evidence, separately identifying those which the party 
expects to offer and those which the party may offer if 
the need arises. 
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or or-
dered by the court, the disclosures required by Subdi-
vision (aX4) shall be made at least 30 days before trial. 
Within 14 days thereafter, unless a different time is 
specified by the court, a party may serve and file a list 
disclosing (i) any objections to the use under Rule 32(a) 
of a deposition designated by another party under 
subparagraph (B) and (ii) any objection, together with 
the grounds therefor, that may be made to the admis-
sibility of materials identified under subparagraph (C). 
Objections not so disclosed, other than objections un-
der Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
shall be deemed waived unless excused by the court for 
^ood cause shown. 
(aX5) Form of disclosures. Unless otherwise stipu-
lated by the parties or ordered by the court, all disclo-
sures under paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) shall be made 
n writing, signed and served. 
(aX6) Methods to discover additional matter. Parties 
nay obtain discovery by one or more of the following 
methods: depositions upon oral examination or written 
questions; written interrogatories; production of docu-
ments or things or permission to enter upon land or 
other property, for inspection and other purposes; 
physical and mental examinations; and requests for 
admission. 
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise 
limited by order of the court in accordance with these 
rules, the scope of discovery is as follows: 
(bXD In general. Parties may obtain discovery re-
garding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to 
the subject matter involved in the pending action, 
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party 
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any 
other party, including the existence, description, na-
ture, custody, condition, and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity 
and location of persons having knowledge of any dis-
coverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the 
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if 
the information sought appears reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
(bX2) A party need not provide discovery of electron-
ically stored information from sources that the party 
identifies as not reasonably accessible because of un-
due burden or cost. The party shall expressly make any 
claim that the source is not reasonably accessible, 
describing the source, the nature and extent of the 
burden, the nature of the information not provided, 
and any other information that will enable other 
parties to assess the claim. On motion to compel 
discovery or for a protective order, the party from 
whom discovery is sought must show that the informa-
tion is not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may 
order discovery from such sources if the requesting 
party shows good cause, considering the limitations of 
subsection (bX3). The court may specify conditions for 
the discovery. 
(bX3) Limitations. The frequency or extent of use of 
the discovery methods set forth in Subdivision (aX6) 
shall be limited by the court if it determines that: 
(bX3XA) the discovery sought is unreasonably cu-
mulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some 
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, 
or less expensive; 
(bX3XB) the party seeking discovery has had ample 
opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the 
information sought; or 
(bX3XC) the discovery is unduly burdensome or 
expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, 
the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' 
resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in 
the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative 
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under 
Subdivision (c). 
(bX4) Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the 
provisions of Subdivision (bX5) of this rule, a party 
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things 
otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (bXD of this 
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for 
trial by or for another party or by or for that other 
party's representative (including the party's attorney, 
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only 
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has 
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of 
the case and that the party is unable without undue 
hardship to obtain the substantia] equivalent of the 
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of 
17 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 26 
such materials when the required showing has been 
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories of an attorney or other representative of a 
party concerning the litigation. 
A party may obtain without the required showing a 
statement concerning the action or its subject matter 
previously made by that party. Upon request, a person 
not a party may obtain without the required showing a 
statement concerning the action or its subject matter 
previously made by that person. If the request is 
refused, the person may move for a court order. The 
provisions of Rule 37(aX4) apply to the award of 
expenses incurred in relation to the motion. For pur-
poses of this paragraph, a statement previously made 
is (A) a written statement signed or otherwise adopted 
or approved by the person making it, or (B) a steno-
graphic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a 
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verba-
tim recital of an oral statement by the person making 
it and contemporaneously recorded. 
(bX5) Trial preparation: Experts. 
(bX5XA) A party may depose any person who has 
been identified as an expert whose opinions may be 
presented at trial. If a report is required under Subdi-
vision (aX3XB), any deposition shall be conducted 
within 60 days after the report is provided. 
(bX5XB) A party may discover facts known or opin-
ions held by an expert who has been retained or 
specially employed by another party in anticipation of 
litigation or preparation for trial and who is not 
expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as 
provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional 
circumstances under which it is impracticable for the 
party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on 
the same subject by other means. 
(bX5XC) Unless manifest injustice would result, 
(bXSXCXi) The court shall require that the party 
seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for 
time spent in responding to discovery under Subdivi-
sion (bX5) of this rule; and 
(bXSXCXii) With respect to discovery obtained un-
der Subdivision (bX5XA) of this rule the court may 
require, and with respect to discovery obtained under 
Subdivision (bX5XB) of this rule the court shall re-
quire, the party seeking discovery to pay the other 
party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably 
incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and 
opinions from the expert. 
(bX6) Claims of privilege or protection of trial prep-
aration materials. 
(bX6XA) Information withheld. When a party with-
holds information otherwise discoverable under these 
rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to 
protection as trial preparation material, the party 
shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the 
nature of the documents, communications, or things 
not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without 
revealing information itself privileged or protected, 
will enable other parties to assess the applicability of 
the privilege or protection. 
(bX6XB) Information produced. If information is 
produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of 
privilege or of protection as trial-preparation material, 
the party making the claim may notify any party that 
received the information of the claim and the basis for 
it. After being notified, a party must promptly return, 
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any 
copies it has and may not use or disclose the informa-
tion until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may 
promptly present the information to the court under 
seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving 
party disclosed the information before being notified, it 
must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The produc-
ing party must preserve the information until the 
claim is resolved. 
(c) Protective orders. Upon motion by a party or by 
the person from whom discovery is sought, accompa-
nied by a certification that the movant has in good 
faith conferred or attempted to confer with other 
affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute 
without court action, and for good cause shown, the 
court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on 
matters relating to a deposition, the court in the 
district where the deposition is to be taken may make 
any order which justice requires to protect a party or 
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, 
or undue burden or expense, including one or more of 
the following: 
(cXD that the discovery not be had; 
(cX2) that the discovery may be had only on speci-
fied terms and conditions, including a designation of 
the time or place; 
(cX3) that the discovery may be had only by a 
method of discovery other than that selected by the 
party seeking discovery; 
(cX4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or 
that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain 
matters; 
(cX5) that discovery be conducted with no one 
present except persons designated by the court; 
(cX6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened 
only by order of the court; 
(cX7) that a trade secret or other confidential re-
search, development, or commercial information not be 
disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; 
(cX8) that the parties simultaneously file specified 
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes 
to be opened as directed by the court. 
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole 
or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions 
as are just, order that any party or person provide or 
permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(aX4) apply 
to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion. 
(d) Sequence and timing of discovery. Except for 
cases exempt under Subdivision (aX2), except as au-
thorized under these rules, or unless otherwise stipu-
lated by the parties or ordered by the court, a party 
may not seek discovery from any source before the 
parties have met and conferred as required by Subdi-
vision (f). Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, fact discovery shall be completed 
within 240 days after the first answer is filed. Unless 
the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties 
and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders 
otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any 
sequence and the fact that a party is conducting 
discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise; shall 
not operate to delay any other part /s discovery. 
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has 
made a disclosure under Subdivision (a) or responded 
to a request for discovery with a response is under a 
duty to supplement the disclosure or response to in-
clude information thereafter acquired if ordered by the 
court or in the following circumstances: 
(eXD A party is under a duty to supplement at 
appropriate intervals disclosures under Subdivision (a) 
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if the party learns that in some material respect the 
information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if 
the additional or corrective information has not other-
wise been made known to the other parties during the 
discovery process or in writing. With respect to testi-
mony of an expert from whom a report is required 
under Subdivision (aX3XB) the duty extends both to 
information contained in the report and to information 
provided through a deposition of the expert. 
(eX2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a 
prior response to an interrogatory, request for produc-
tion, or request for admission if the party learns that 
the response is in some material respect incomplete or 
incorrect and if the additional or corrective informa-
tion has not otherwise been made known to the other 
parties during the discovery process or in writing. 
(f) Discovery and scheduling conference. 
The following applies to all cases not exempt under 
Subdivision (aX2), except as otherwise stipulated or 
directed by order. 
(fXD The parties shall, as soon as practicable after 
commencement of the action, meet in person or by 
telephone to discuss the nature and basis of their 
claims and defenses, to discuss the possibilities for 
settlement of the action, to make or arrange for the 
disclosures required by Subdivision (aXl), to discuss 
any issues relating to preserving discoverable informa-
tion and to develop a stipulated discovery plan. Plain-
tiffs counsel shall schedule the meeting. The attorneys 
of record shall be present at the meeting and shall 
attempt in good faith to agree upon the discovery plan. 
(f X2) The plan shall include: 
(fX2XA) what changes should be made in the tim-
ing, form, or requirement for disclosures under Subdi-
vision (a), including a statement as to when disclosures 
under Subdivision (aXl) were made or will be made; 
(fX2XB) the subjects on which discovery may be 
needed, when discovery should be completed, whether 
discovery should be conducted in phases and whether 
discovery should be limited to particular issues; 
(fX2XC) any issues relating to preservation, disclo-
sure or discovery of electronically stored information, 
including the form or forms in which it should be 
produced; 
(fX2XD) any issues relating to claims of privilege or 
of protection as trial-preparation material, including 
— if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such 
claims after production — whether to ask the court to 
include their agreement in an order; 
(fK2XE) what changes should be made in the limi-
tations on discovery imposed under these rules, and 
what other limitations should be imposed; 
(fX2XF) the deadline for filing the description of the 
factual and legal basis for allocating fault to a non-
party and the identity of the non-party; and 
(fK2XG) any other orders that should be entered by 
the court 
(fX3) Plaintiffs counsel shall submit to the court 
within 14 days after the meeting and in any event no 
more than 60 days after the first answer is filed a 
proposed form of order in conformity with the parties' 
stipulated discovery plan. The proposed form of order 
shall also include each of the subjects listed in Rule 
16tt>XlM6), except that the date or dates for pretrial 
conferences, final pretrial conference and trial shall be 
scheduled with the court or may be deferred until the 
close of discovery. If the parties are unable to agree to 
the terms of a discovery plan or any part thereof, the 
plaintiff shall and any party may move the court for 
entry of a discovery order on any topic on which the 
parties are unable to agree. Unless otherwise ordered 
by the court, the presumptions established by these 
rules shall govern any subject not included within the 
parties' stipulated discovery plan. 
(f X4) Any party may request a scheduling and man-
agement conference or order under Rule 16(b). 
(fX5) A party joined after the meeting of the parties 
is bound by the stipulated discovery plan and discovery 
order, unless the court orders on stipulation or motion 
a modification of the discovery plan and order. The 
stipulation or motion shall be filed within a reasonable 
time after joinder. 
(g) Signing of discovery requests, responses, and 
objections. Every request for discovery or response or 
objection thereto made by a party shall be signed by at 
least one attorney of record or by the party if the party 
is not represented, whose address shall be stated. The 
signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certi-
fication that the person has read the request, response, 
or objection and that to the best of the person's knowl-
edge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules and war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) 
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreason-
able or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the 
needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, 
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the 
issues at stake in the litigation. If a request, response, 
or objection is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it 
is signed promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the party making the request, response, or 
objection, and a party shall not be obligated to take any 
action with respect to it until it is signed. 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the 
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
impose upon the person who made the certification, the 
party on whose behalf the request, response, or objec-
tion is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which 
may include an order to pay the amount of the reason-
able expenses incurred because of the violation, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney fee. 
(h) Deposition where action pending in another 
state. Any party to an action or proceeding in another 
state may take the deposition of any person within this 
state, in the same manner and subject to the same 
conditions and limitations as if such action or proceed-
ing were pending in this state, provided that in order to 
obtain a subpoena the notice of the taking of such 
deposition shall be filed with the clerk of the court of 
the county in which the person whose deposition is to 
be taken resides or is to be served, and provided 
further that all matters arising during the taking of 
such deposition which by the rules are required to be 
submitted to the court shall be submitted to the court 
in the county where the deposition is being taken. 
(i) Filing. 
(iXD Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a party 
shall not file disclosures or requests for discovery with 
the court, but shall file only the original certificate of 
service stating that the disclosures or requests for 
discovery have been served on the other parties and 
the date of service. Unless otherwise ordered by the 
court, a party shall not file a response to a request for 
discovery with the court, but shall file only the original 
certificate of service stating that the response has been 
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served on the other parties and the date of service. 
Except as provided in Rule 30(0(1), Rule 32 or unless 
otherwise ordered by the court, depositions shall not be 
filed with the court. 
(iX2) A party filing a motion under Subdivision (c) or 
a motion under Rule 37(a) shall attach to the motion a 
copy of the request for discovery or the response which 
is at issue. 
Rule 27. Depos i t ions before act ion or pending 
appeal . 
(a) Before action. 
(aXl) Petition. A person who desires to perpetuate 
testimony regarding any matter that may be cogniza-
ble in any court of this state may file a verified petition 
in the district court of the county in which any ex-
pected adverse party may reside. 
The petition shall be entitled in the name of the 
petitioner and shall state: (1) that the petitioner ex-
pects to be a party to an action cognizable in a court of 
this state but is presently unable to bring it or cause it 
to be brought, (2) the subject matter of the expected 
action and the petitioner's interest therein, (3) the 
facts to be established by the proposed testimony and 
the reasons to perpetuate it, (4) the names or a 
description of the persons expected to be adverse 
parties and their addresses so far as known, and (5) the 
names and addresses of the persons to be examined 
and the substance of the testimony expected to be 
elicited from each, and shall ask for an order authoriz-
ing the petitioner to take the depositions of the persons 
to be examined named in the petition, for the purpose 
of perpetuating their testimony. 
(aX2) Notice and service. The petitioner shall there-
after serve a notice upon each person named in the 
petition as an expected adverse party, together with a 
copy of the petition, stating that the petitioner will 
apply to the court, at a time and place named therein, 
for the order described in the petition. At least 20 days 
before the date of hearing the notice shall be served 
either within or without the district or state in the 
manner provided in Rule 4(d) for service of summons; 
but if such service cannot with due diligence be made 
upon any expected adverse party named in the peti-
tion, the court may make such order as is just for 
service by publication or otherwise, and shall appoint, 
for persons not served in the manner provided in Rule 
4(d), an attorney who shall represent them, and, in 
case they are not otherwise represented, shall cross-
examine the deponent. If any expected adverse party is 
a minor or incompetent the provisions of Rule 17(c) 
apply. 
(aX3) Order and examination. If the court is satis-
fied that the perpetuation of the testimony may pre-
vent a failure or delay of justice, it shall make an order 
designating or describing the persons whose deposi-
tions may be taken and specifying the subject matter of 
the examination and whether the depositions shall be 
taken upon oral examination or written interrogator-
ies. The depositions may then be taken in accordance 
with these rules; and the court may make orders of the 
character provided for by Rules 34 and 35. For the 
purpose of applying these rules to depositions for 
perpetuating testimony, each reference therein to the 
court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to 
refer to the court in which the petition for such 
deposition was filed. 
(aX4) Use of deposition. If a deposition to perpetuate 
testimony is taken under these rules or if, although not 
so taken, it would be admissible in evidence in the 
courts of the state in which it is taken, it may be used 
in any action involving the same subject matter sub-
sequently brought in any court of this state, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Rule 32(a). 
(b) Pending appeal. If an appeal has been taken 
from a judgment of a district court or before the taking 
of an appeal if the time therefor has not expired, the 
district court in which the judgment was rendered may 
allow the taking of the depositions of witnesses to 
perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of 
further proceedings in such court. In such case the 
party who desires to perpetuate the testimony may 
make a motion in the district court for leave to take the 
depositions, upon the same notice and service thereof 
as if the action was pending in the district court. The 
motion shall show (1) the names and addresses of 
persons to be examined and the substance of the 
testimony which expected to be elicited from each; and 
(2) the reasons for perpetuating their testimony. If the 
court finds that the perpetuation of the testimony is 
proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may 
make an order allowing the depositions to be taken and 
may make orders of the character provided for by 
Rules 34 and 35, and thereupon the depositions may be 
taken and used in the same manner and under the 
same conditions as are prescribed in these rules for 
depositions taken in actions pending in the district 
court. 
(c) Perpetuation by action. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an action to perpetu-
ate testimony. 
Rule 28. Persons before w h o m depos i t ions m a y 
be taken. 
(a) Within the United States. Within the United 
States or within a territory or insular possession 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, depo-
sitions shall be taken before an officer authorized to 
administer oaths by the laws of the United States or of 
the place where the examination is held, or before a 
person appointed by the court in which the action is 
pending. A person so appointed has power to adminis-
ter oaths and take testimony. The term "officer* as used 
in Rules 30 ,31 , and 32 includes a person appointed by 
the court or designated by the parties under Rule 29. 
(b) In foreign countries. In a foreign country, depo-
sitions may be taken (1) on notice before a person 
authorized to administer oaths in the place in which 
the examination is held, either by the law thereof or by 
the law of the United States, or (2) before a person 
commissioned by the court, and a person so commis-
sioned shall have the power by virtue of his commis-
sion to administer any necessary oath and take testi-
mony, or (3) pursuant to a letter rogatory. A 
commission or a letter rogatory shall be issued on 
application and notice and on terms that are just and 
appropriate. It is not requisite to the issuance of a 
commission or a letter rogatory that the taking of the 
deposition in any other manner is impracticable or 
inconvenient; and both a commission and a letter 
rogatory may be issued in proper cases. A notice or 
commission may designate the person before whom the 
deposition is to be taken either by name or descriptive 
title. A letter rogatory may be addressed "Tb the 
Appropriate Authority in [here name of country].* 
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unless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall 
not be required to serve answers or objections before 
the expiration of 45 days after service of the summons 
and complaint upon him. If objection is made, the 
reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall 
specifically deny the mat ter or set forth in detail the 
reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully 
admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the 
substance of the requested admission, and when good 
faith requires tha t a party qualify his answer or deny 
only a par t of the matter of which an admission is 
requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and 
qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party 
may not give lack of information or knowledge as a 
reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states 
tha t he has made reasonable inquiry and tha t the 
information known or readily obtainable by him is 
insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who 
considers that a matter of which an admission has 
been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may 
not, on tha t ground alone, object to the request; he 
may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the 
matter or set forth reasons why he cannot admit or 
deny it. 
(aX3) The party who has requested the admissions 
may move to determine the sufficiency of the answers 
or objections. Unless the court determines tha t an 
objection is justified, it shall order tha t an answer be 
served. If the court determines tha t an answer does not 
comply with the requirements of this rule, i t may order 
either that the matter is admitted or that an amended 
answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these 
orders, determine that final disposition of the request 
be made at a pretrial conference or a t a designated 
time prior to trial. The provisions of Rule 37(aX4) apply 
to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the 
motion. 
(b) Effect of admission. Any mat ter admitted under 
this rule is conclusively established unless the court on 
motion permits withdrawal or aweiiuuieiit of the ad-
mission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing 
amendment of a pretrial order, the court may permit 
withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of 
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and 
the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy 
the court tha t withdrawal or amendment will prejudice 
him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. 
Any admission made by a party under this rule is for 
the purpose of the pending action only and is not an 
admission by him for any other purpose nor may it be 
used against him in any other proceeding. 
Rule 37. Fai lure t o make o r cooperate in discov-
ery; s a n c t i o n s . 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery^ A party, 
upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons 
affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling 
discovery as follows: 
(aXD Appropriate court An application for an order 
to a party may be made to the court in which the action 
is pending, or, on matters relating to a deposition, to 
the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is 
not a party shall be made to the court in the district 
where the deposition is being taken. 
(aX2) Motion. 
(aX2XA) If a party fails to make a disclosure re-
quired by Rule 26(a), any other party may move to 
compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The 
motion must include a certification tha t the movant 
has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with 
the party not making the disclosure in an effort to 
secure the disclosure without court action. 
(aX2XB) If a deponent fails to answer a question 
propounded or submitted under Rule 30 or 31 , or a 
corporation or other entity fails to make a designation 
under Rule 30(bX6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, 
in response to a request for inspection submitted under 
Rule 34, fails to respond tha t inspection will be per-
mitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order 
compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order 
compelling inspection in accordance with the request. 
The motion must include a certification tha t the mov-
an t has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer 
with the person or party failing to make the discovery 
in an effort to secure the information or material 
without court action. When taking a deposition on oral 
examination, the proponent of the question may com-
plete or adjourn the examination before applying for 
an order. 
(aX3) Evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or 
response. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or 
incomplete disclosure, answer, DT response is to be 
treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond. 
(aX4) Expenses and sanctions. 
(aX4XA) If the motion is granted, or if the disclosure 
or requested discovery is provided after the motion was 
filed, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessi-
tated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the 
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, 
including attorney fees, unless the court finds tha t the 
motion was filed without the movant's first making a 
good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or discovery 
without court action, or tha t the opposing party's 
nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially 
justified or tha t other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
(aX4XB) If the motion is denied, the court may enter 
any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the moving 
party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the 
motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing 
the motion, including attorney fees, unless the court 
finds tha t the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or tha t other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
(aX4XC) Lf the motion is granted in par t and denied 
in part , the court may enter any protective order 
authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after opportu-
nity for hearing, apportion the reasonable expenses 
incurred in relation to the motion among the parties 
and persons in a jus t manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(bXD Sanctions by court in district where deposition 
is taken. If a deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a 
question after being directed to do so by the court in 
the district in which the deposition is being taken, the 
failure may be considered a contempt of tha t court. 
(bX2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. 
If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 
16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or managing 
agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 
Rule 38 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 
30(bX6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to 
obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including 
an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or 
Rule 35, unless the court finds tha t the failure was 
substantially justified, the court in which the action is 
pending may take such action in regard to the failure 
as are jus t , including the following: 
(bX2XA) deem the mat ter or any other designated 
facts to be established for the purposes of the action in 
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the 
order; 
(bX2XB) prohibit the disobedient party from sup-
porting or opposing designated claims or defenses or 
from introducing designated mat ters in evidence; 
(bX2XC) strike pleadings or par ts thereof, stay fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismiss the 
action or proceeding or any par t thereof, or render 
judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(bX2XD) order the party or the attorney to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused 
by the failure; 
(bX2XE) t rea t the failure to obey an order, other 
than an order to submit to a physical or mental 
examination, as contempt of court; and 
(bX2XF) instruct the jury regarding an adverse in-
ference. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to 
admit the genuineness of any document or the t ru th of 
any mat te r as requested under Rule 36, and if the 
party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the 
genuineness of the document or the t ru th of the mat-
ter, the party requesting the admissions may apply to 
the court for an order requiring the other party to pay 
the reasonable expenses incurred in making tha t proof, 
including reasonable attorney fees. The court shall 
make the order unless i t finds tha t (1) the request was 
field objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the 
admission sought was of no substantia] importance, or 
[3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to 
believe t h a l h e might prevail on the matter, or (4) there 
•vas other good reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or 
ierve answers to interrogatories or respond to request 
or inspection. If a party or an officer, director, or 
nanaging agent of a party or a person designated 
inder Rule 3(XbX6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a 
>arty fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take 
he deposition, after being served with a proper notice, 
>r (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories 
ubmitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the 
aterrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a 
equest for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after 
roper service of the request, the court on motion may 
ake any action authorized by Subdivision (bX2). 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may 
ot be excused on the ground that the discovery sought 
i objectionable unless the party failing to act has 
pplied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c), 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discov-
y plan. If a party or attorney fails to participate in 
ood faith in the framing of a discovery plan by 
greement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court on 
totion may take any action authorized by Subdivision 
>X2). 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a 
itness, document or other material as required by 
ale 26(a) or Rules 26(eXD, or to amend a prior 
sponse to discovery as required by Rule 26(eX2), that 
irty shall not be permitted to use the witness, docu-
ment or other material a t any hearing unless the 
failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good 
cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu 
of this sanction, the court on motion may take any 
action authorized by Subdivision (bX2). 
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule 
limits the inherent power of the court to take any 
action authorized by Subdivision (bX2) if a party de-
stroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to pre-
serve a document, tangible item, electronic data or 
other evidence in violation of a duty. Absent excep-
tional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions 
under these rules on a party for failing to provide 
electronically stored information lost as a result of the 
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic informa-
tion system. 
PART VI. TRIALS 
Rule 38. J u r y trial of r ight . 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as 
declared by the constitution or as given by s ta tute shall 
be preserved to t he parties. 
(b) Demand. Any par ty may demand a trial by jury 
of any issue triable of right by a jury by paying the 
statutory jury fee and serving upon the other parties a 
demand therefor in writing a t any time after the 
commencement of the action and not later than 10 
days after the service of the last pleading directed to 
such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a 
pleading of the party. 
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a 
party may specify the issues which he wishes so tried; 
otherwise he shall be deemed to have demanded trial 
by jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded 
trial by ju ry for only some of the issues, any other 
party, within 10 days after service of the demand or 
such lesser t ime as the court may order, may serve a 
demand for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues 
of fac t i f f lhe action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statu-
tory fee, to serve a demand as required by this rule and 
to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver 
by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made 
as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the 
consent of the part ies. 
Rule 39. Trial b y jury o r by the court . 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded 
as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated 
upon the register of actions as a jury action. The trial 
of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(aXD The part ies or their attorneys of record, by 
written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral 
stipulation made in open court and entered in the 
record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a 
jury, or 
(aX2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative 
finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those 
issues does not exist, or 
(aX3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the 
trial. 
(b) By the court. Issues not demanded for trial by 
jury as provided in Rule 38 shall be tried by the court; 
but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand 
a jury in an action in which such a demand might have 
been made of right, the court in its discretion upon 
motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues. 
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DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO 
EXCLUDE EVIDENCE RELATING TO DAMAGES NOT DISCLOSED IN 
PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORY RESPONSE AND IN EXPERT REPORT 
MICHAEL R. MERZ, Chief Magistrate Judge. 
*1 This case is before the Court on Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Any 
Evidence Relating to Damages Allegedly Suffered by Plaintiffs that Was Not Disclosed 
in Plaintiffs1 Damages Interrogatory Response and in the Corresponding Expert Report of 
Gregory H. Toman and Request for Expedited Ruling (Doc. No. 132). Plaintiffs oppose 
the Motion (Doc. No. 134). 
Procedural History 
This case was removed to this Court on March 12, 2003.— A Preliminary Pretrial 
Conference Order was entered by Judge Rose on September 24, 2003, that contemplated 
phased discovery with liability issues in Phase I and damages issues in Phase II and a trial 
in June 2005 (Doc. No. 36; See also the parties Rule 26(f) Report, Doc. No. 31). 
FN1. On March 31, 2006, it was officially reported to Congress as having been pending 
longer than the presumptive three-year limit set by the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. 
Such cases require the highest priority for trial consistent with Speedy Trial settings of 
criminal cases. 
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(C), each party in federal litigation is required to disclose 
without demand 
a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making 
available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary 
material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such computation is 
based, including material bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; 
The parties agreed in their Rule 26(f) Report (Doc. No. 31) to make the Rule 26(a)(1) 
disclosures on or before August 6, 2003. On that date, Plaintiffs served on Defendant the 
following statement: 
In their complaint, the plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, an 
accounting, and attorneys' fees. Counsel for the parties have agreed to postpone any 
specific computation of any of these categories of damages pending the conclusion of 
"Phase I" of the parties' discovery. Upon completion of Phase I of discovery, the 
plaintiffs will automatically, and promptly, supplement this disclosure to provide the 
necessary computation (and supporting documentation) for all categories of damages 
remaining relevant at that time. 
(Exhibit 1 to Doc. No. 132). Plaintiffs have never supplemented this disclosure. 
On September 12, 2003, Defendant served on Plaintiffs the following interrogatory: 
20. With respect to each item of damage that Plaintiffs claim in the First Amended 
Complaint, state: 
a. the nature of the damages (including but not limited to whether the alleged damage 
relates to the handling fee, the storage fee, non-payment of weigher/grader, cost of 
purchase of the Facilities, cost of repairs to the Facilities, and/or cost of demolition of the 
Facilities); 
b. the precise amount of each claim of damage; 
c. describe in detail all facts on which you rely in making each claim of damage; 
d. describe in detail the method by which you calculate each item of damage; and 
e. identify and produce all documents which support, refer or relate in any way to your 
responses to this interrogatory. 
Plaintiffs responded 
ANSWER: 
The Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory because it is unrelated to Phase I of discovery in 
this case. The Plaintiffs will respond to this interrogatory during Phase II of the discovery 
proceedings. 
*2 (Plaintiffs1 Responses to Defendant's Third Set of Interrogatories, Exhibit 2 to Doc. 
No. 132). 
On April 21, 2005, Judge Rose entered an Amended Preliminary Pretrial Conference 
Order which eliminated the phased discovery; set a discovery deadline of November 3, 
2005; and continued the trial to its present date, May 22, 2006. After the schedule was 
amended, Defendant sought an answer to its damages interrogatory. On July 22, 2005, 
Plaintiffs provided the following answer to Interrogatory No. 20. 
ANSWER: 
See Plaintiffs' Financial Expert Witness Report, filed July 7, 2005, which contains 
detailed responses to subparts (a)-(d) above. 
Plaintiffs' financial expert specifically reserved the right to supplement his report based 
upon additional documents or evidence that might become available. 
In addition, CGB maintains documents that support and will affect Plaintiffs' calculation 
of damages contained in the Financial Expert Witness Report. These documents, 
specifically with respect to Topic No. 4, have recently been ordered by the Court to be 
produced. See Decision and Order (Doc. # 101). 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement this response based upon any documents 
produced as a result of the Court's recent Decision and Order (Doc. #101). 
Defendant then deposed Plaintiffs' damages expert, Mr. Toman, just before November 1, 
2005, discovery cut-off. He testified that he had no other opinions about damages beyond 
those he had disclosed and he has never supplemented his testimony or expert report. 
On April 26, 2006, after a dispute in settlement negotiations about how much Plaintiffs 
could recover at trial, Plaintiffs served a supplemental answer to Interrogatory 20 as 
follows: 
ANSWER: 
Plaintiffs object to this interrogatory to the extent that it calls for legal conclusions and 
seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product 
doctrine. 
Plaintiffs further state that, at the time this interrogatory was initially answered, and at the 
time initial disclosures were made pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1), the parties had agreed to 
implement two phases of discovery-liability and then damages. Without waiving these 
objections, and subject thereto, Plaintiffs respond as follows: 
a. Damages with respect to remaining claims are as follows: 
Count 1-breach of contract, failure to negotiate storage fees for second and third year in 
good faith, non-payment of weigher/grader. 
Count 3-breach of fiduciary duties arising from attempt to form partnership regarding 
seed program and seed manual. 
Count 4-fraud regarding CGB' s intent to work for mutual benefit and concealment of 
fact that it had no intention of honoring partnership and intended to use seed program for 
its own use. 
Count 5-violation of Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
Count 7-conversion of Martin Land Company funds 
a. Precise amount of each damage claim: 
Count 1-$350,000 for storage fees for both years plus $47,000 for weigher/grader for a 
total of$397,000. 
*3 Count 3-specific dollar amount unknown and to be determined by the jury as no 
authority addresses measure of damages for breach of fiduciary duty during formation of 
partnership; however, at the very least, R.C. 1775.20 provides the remedy of an 
accounting. 
Count 4-specific dollar amount unknown and to be determined by the jury; however, 
compensatory damages include purchase price of Facilities, travel time and expenses. 
Count 5-specific dollar amount to be determined at trial; while Plaintiffs' economic exert 
Greg Toman's report states damages in the amount of$ 152,275, he specifically reserved 
the right to supplement his opinion on the quantity and expressly based the figure on 
assumptions and limited documentation; in addition, Sixth Circuit authority permits 
David Martin to testify as to trade secret damages and the amount of damages will be 
calculated based on a minimum of 500,000 bushels. 
Count 7-$5,500 
c. The facts supporting each claim are found in Greg Toman's expert report, deposition 
testimony from this case and all documents produced in discovery. 
d. The methods of damages calculations are described above and in Greg Toman's expert 
report; with respect to damages on the trade secrets claim, the $4.75 market price per 
bushel at relevant time less $3.85 total cost per bushel = 90 cents margin per bushel x 
number of bushels (500,000 minimum). 
e. All documents supporting each damage claim have been exchanged in discovery. 
(Exhibit 6 to Doc. No. 132). 
Analysis 
Defendant seeks to exclude at trial any damage theory or evidence not disclosed by 
Plaintiffs' damages expert, Greg Toman, in his report or deposition because it read 
Plaintiffs' July, 2005, answer to Interrogatory 20 as saying that Toman would be the sole 
source of damages testimony (Motion Doc. No. 132). Defendant relies on Fed.R.Civ.P. 
37(c)(1) which provides: 
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by 
Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 
26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial, at a 
hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed. 
Defendant notes that Plaintiffs never supplemented their Rule 26(a)(1) disclosure and 
Toman never supplemented his expert report; the only supplementation on damages has 
been the amended answer to Interrogatory 20 which came less than a month before trial 
when the parties disagreed in settlement negotiations about Plaintiffs' potential recovery. 
Defendant argues the amended answer is not timely supplementation because it 
introduces new theories, new amounts, and at least one new damages witness, Plaintiff 
David Martin, and Defendant has had no opportunity for discovery on this amended 
answer. Therefore, Defendant argues, the late supplementation is not justified and 
certainly not harmless, since discovery has closed. 
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion in Limine because they claim: "(A) CGB has not 
demonstrated the Plaintiffs' response did not comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a) or 
alternatively supplementation was justified; (B) CGB was not prejudiced by the 
supplementation; and (C) CGB's own actions mandate denial of the Motion in Limine." 
(Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 134, at 2.) 
*4 Plaintiffs assert first that Defendant misinterprets their Answer to Interrogatory No. 
20 to say they would rely solely on Mr. Toman to testify on damages (Doc. No. 134 at 6), 
but the Court finds that to be a completely reasonable interpretation of the original 
Answer. While it indicates Mr. Toman may supplement his report, he has never done so. 
While it indicates Plaintiff may discover new documents as a result of the Court's order 
compelling Defendant to produce and may supplement based on those documents, 
Plaintiffs never supplemented on their own initiative as Rule 26(e) requires and have 
sought to add far more than numbers derived from late-produced documents. 
1. Duty to Supplement 
Plaintiffs next argue that, before it can justify sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1), 
Defendant must show that "the 'new' damages information fell within the ambit of Rule 
26(a) and, in fact, cannot do so ... because the Plaintiffs informed CGB of their intention 
to put on evidence regarding the costs of the subject Facilities over three years ago." Id. 
at 9. Plaintiffs claim Defendant acknowledges this fact in footnote 4 of the Motion in 
Limine. In fact that footnote reads 
Plaintiffs' claim for damages concerning the purchase price of the Facilities is outrageous. 
Indeed, on May 31, 2005, CGB previously moved for summary judgment with respect to 
this exact damages claim. See CGB's Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Document 79-1, pp. 17-19. On June 21, 2005, Plaintiffs responded that such issue was 
not ripe for this Court's decision. See Pltfs' Opposition to Second Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, Document 90-1, pp. 38-39. Now, Plaintiffs appear to be making a 
claim for such damages. 
(Doc. No. 132 at 5.) In fact, the footnote is not an acknowledgment that Plaintiffs have 
ever answered Interrogatory No. 20 as to damages for the purchase price of the Facilities. 
Instead, it is an expression of outrage that, despite having made such a claim during the 
pendency of the suit, Plaintiffs have not produced an answer to Interrogatory No. 20 with 
respect to such damages. For example, what is the claimed amount of such damages? 
Even the April 26, 2006, answer says the amount is as yet undetermined. 
With respect to damages for misappropriation of trade secrets, Plaintiffs assert that 
under Ohio law the damages to be awarded for the improper use of a trade secret are 
often determined by a jury, not by a mathematical calculation established by an expert. 
Lay witness testimony is unquestionably appropriate for this purpose. 
(Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 134, at 6.) Plaintiffs assert that trade secret 
damages "simply do not fall within the ambit of Rule 26(a)." They purport to quote the 
Advisory Committee to this effect: 
As explained in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Rule 26, the 
supplementation "... obligation applies only with respect to documents then reasonably 
available.... Likewise, a party would not be expected to provide a calculation of damages 
which, as in may [sic] patent infringement actions, depends on information in the 
possession of another party or person." 
*5 (Doc. No. 134 at 9-10). This is a serious misquotation; quoted language appears in the 
Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amendments to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(C) which 
prescribes the initial disclosure requirement, not in the Notes to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e), the 
supplementation requirement. 
In asserting they had no duty to supplement, Plaintiffs rely on Johnson v. H.K. 
Webster, Inc., 775 F.2d L 3Fed. R. Serv.3d 20 (1st Cir.1985). However, the First Circuit 
in that case was interpreting the pre-1993 version of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) which provided 
Supplementation of Responses: A party who has responded to a request for discovery 
with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his 
response to include information thereafter acquired, except as follows:... 
The 1993 Amendments to Rule 26 very substantially changed the obligation to 
supplement. The First Circuit itself recognized this in Klonoski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d 255 
(1st Cir. 1998) holding expressly with respect to Johnson v. Webster that "pre-1993 cases 
analyzing the sanction issue under the pre-amendment rubric retain only limited authority 
in this post-amendment era." Id. at 269, n. 5. Klonoski is not cited by Plaintiffs, but was 
readily revealed when the Court shepardized Johnson. 
Based on their analysis of Rule 26, Plaintiffs assert they were not required to 
supplement the prior answer to Interrogatory 20 at all, but that it was "provided solely as 
a gratuitous accommodation to CGB, as it is the jury that will make this ultimate 
determination at trial anyway. See, Avery Dennison Corp. v. Four Pillars Enterprise Co. 
and P. Y.. 45 Fed.Appx. 479, 60 Fed.R.Evid. Serv. 353, (C.A.6, 2002)." The fact that a 
jury will decide a question does not excuse a party from telling its opponent what 
testimony it will place before the jury to make that determination. Avery Dennison does 
not purport in any way to speak to the duties of a party in discovery. 
Plaintiffs were under a duty, imposed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) to timely supplement both 
their Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures and their answer to Interrogatory 20; their argument that 
they had no such duty in unpersuasive. 
2. Justification for Late Supplementation: 
Plaintiffs then argue "Mr. Martin's testimony about the Plaintiffs' damages with regard 
to CGB's unauthorized use of the Seed Manual is solely based upon projections and 
documents provided by and in the possession of CGB." Id. at 10. They note that the 
500,000 bushel projection which will form the basis of Mr. Martin's projected testimony 
is taken directly from Consolidated's documents produced in discovery. Id. 
Plaintiffs claim their late supplementation is justified by Defendant's failure to request 
supplementation until the time when it was produced. (Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. 
No. 134, at 11). Plaintiffs also argue that their failure to supplement is justified by 
Consolidated's having moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' trade secret claim. Id. 
They argue "[i]f CGB had provided the Plaintiffs with information regarding Precision 
Soya, which it was required to do, then the Plaintiffs would have known earlier that trade 
secret damages would be relevant for trial." Id. However, the duty to supplement under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) is not triggered by an opposing party's request or suspended by an 
opponent's summary judgment motion. Instead, "[t]he obligation to supplement 
disclosures and discovery responses applies whenever a party learns that its prior 
disclosures or responses are in some material respect incomplete or incorrect." Advisory 
Committee Notes to 1993 Amendment to Rule 26(e). 
*6 Assuming Plaintiffs learned very late in the discovery period about the Precision 
Soya-Consolidated 500,000 bushel projection,— they were without justification in 
waiting six months to amend the answer. 
FN2. The Court here merely uses Plaintiffs' characterization of this information, as the 
Court has not seen this material. 
3. Late Supplementation is Harmless 
Next Plaintiffs assert that their late disclosure is harmless because Count 5 for 
misappropriation of trade secrets was pled from the very beginning of the case and "the 
nature of damages available for a violation of Ohio's Uniform Trade Secrets Act call for a 
determination by a jury and simply do not lend themselves to the absolute, mathematical 
calculation demanded by CGB." (Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 134, at 12.) 
This argument misses the point entirely. The fact that a jury will make the 
determination of damages in no way implies that an opposing party is not entitled to 
discovery the testimony on which the jury will make that determination. The authority 
cited by Plaintiffs does indeed hold that "plaintiffs have used a number of different 
methods of calculation to determine damages." Mid-Michigan Computer Systems. Inc. v. 
Glassman, 416 F.3d 505, 510 (6th Cir.2005), quoting Avery Dennison Corp. v. Four 
Pillars Enterprise Co., 45 Fed. Appx. 479, 485 (6th Cir.2002). But this authority supports 
Defendant's position on the instant Motion rather than Plaintiffs': if there are a number of 
different methods a plaintiff might choose among for proving damages, a defendant is 
entitled to know which method this particular plaintiff is choosing in this case, and to 
know it in time to prepare a defense. 
Apparently Plaintiffs now expect to use a "reasonable royalty" approach to damages, 
which is one of the measures of damages contemplated by Ohio Revised Code § 1333.63 
and Mid-Michigan, supra. They state: 
Mr. Martin certainly has the right to testify as to his belief about what a reasonable 
royalty should be [but] his testimony is not dispositive. In sum then, CGB cannot be 
harmed or prejudiced by the April supplementation because it is the jury's calculation of 
royalty damages that is important, not Mr. Martin's. 
(Memorandum in Opposition, Doc. No. 134, at 13.) But even the April 26, 2006, 
supplementation does not say Plaintiffs are using a reasonable royalty method, what Mr. 
Martin believes the reasonable royalty rate is, how he reached that conclusion, and why 
the rate he will testify to is reasonable. The fact that the Sixth Circuit has approved the 
reasonable royalty method says nothing about Mr. Martin's competence to testify what a 
reasonably royalty rate is or that he can take the stand to state his "belief without having 
disclosed the basis for it prior to trial. 
4. Competing Discovery Misconduct 
In the last section of their Memorandum in Opposition, Plaintiffs ask the Court to 
weigh any violation of Rule 26(e) which they are found to have committed against 
Consolidated's discovery violations. They assert "CGB's failure to forward the Precision 
Soya documentation, standing alone, more than offsets any harm CGB might experience 
due to the late supplementation...." (Id. at 16), leading to the conclusion Plaintiffs should 
not be sanctioned at all. In suggesting this would be appropriate, Plaintiffs rely entirely 
on case authority from before the 1993 Amendment to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) which 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
*7 A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by 
Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 
26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at trial, at a 
hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed 
In interpreting this Rule, the Sixth Circuit has held: 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) requires absolute compliance with Rule 26(a), 
that is, it "mandates that a trial court punish a party for discovery violations in connection 
with Rule 26 unless the violation was harmless or is substantially justified." Vance v. 
United States, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 14943, 1999 WL 455435, at *3 (1999) (footnote 
omitted); see also Salzado v. General Motors Corp.. 150 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir.1998) 
(noting that "the sanction of exclusion is automatic and mandatory unless the sanctioned 
party can show that its violation of Rule 26(a) was either justified or harmless"). We 
agree with the circuits that have put the burden on the potentially sanctioned party to 
prove harmlessness. See Salgado, 150 F.3d at 741-42: Wilson v. Bradlees of New 
England. Inc., 250 F.3d 10, 21 (1st Cir.2001); Heidtman v. County of El Paso, 171 F.3d 
1038, 1040 (5th Cir.1999). The decision not to impose sanctions is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. See King v. Ford Motor Co., 209 F.3d 886, 900 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 531 
U.S. 960, 121 S.Ct. 386, 148 L.Ed.2d 298 (2000). 
Roberts v. Galen ofVa., Inc., 325 F.3d 776, 782 (6th Cir.2003). Plaintiffs have not 
proved that their failure to comply at an appropriate time with Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e) was 
either harmless or substantially justified. 
The Court expressly rejects Plaintiffs' argument that Defendant's resistance to 
discovery justifies their late response. The proper method of dealing with discovery 
violations is to file a motion to compel. When Plaintiffs did so, they received this Court's 
assistance (See Decision and Order, Doc. No. 101). 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Any Evidence Relating to 
Damages Allegedly Suffered by Plaintiffs that Was Not Disclosed in Plaintiffs' Damages 
Interrogatory Response and in the Corresponding Expert Report of Gregory H. Toman is 
GRANTED. Plaintiffs' damages testimony at trial is limited to that disclosed by Gregory 
H. Toman in his expert report and deposition. If Mr. Toman states in his expert report 
that the amount of damages from imposing a reasonable royalty rate is dependent on the 
number of bushels Consolidated would have sold and Plaintiffs can show the number of 
bushel projection they rely on was made by Consolidated in documents which 
Consolidated should have produced earlier but did not produce until the end of discovery 
or which Plaintiffs had to obtain from Precision Soya, then Mr. Toman may base his 
testimony on that figure. 
S.D.Ohio,2006. 
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